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2ABSTRACT
Solidarity Forever:  The Story of the Flint Sit-Down Strike and the Communist Party from the 
Perspective of the Rank and File Autoworkers
by
Brandi McCloud
The subject of this thesis is the Sit-Down Strike in Flint, Michigan in 1936-1937.  The main 
purpose is to examine the story of the strike as told by the strikers themselves, to explore the role 
that Communists played in the strike along with how the workers responded the Communism 
and other political ideologies of the day.  The final chapter then examines the many anti-
Communist forces that surrounded the autoworkers before, during, and after the Sit-Down Strike, 
which may account for the strikers’ reluctance to admit their affiliation with the Communists.
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5CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Sit-Down Strike in Flint, Michigan in 1936-1937, a dynamic turning point in labor 
history, changed not only the auto industry but American industry as a whole.  In the years since 
the strike, historians have scrutinized it in many different contexts, although rarely has it been 
the subject of an entire study.  Perhaps the reason for this is because the strike is seen as an 
important part of a larger story in labor, the auto industry, the New Deal, and Communist history.   
To gain a clearer perspective of this momentous labor event, it is essential to look at the story of 
the strike and the unionization of General Motors through the eyes of the average workingmen 
who were involved in the strike, the rank and file autoworkers in Flint, Michigan.  There are 
many things that we already know about the strike, the leaders, and the results, yet there is so 
little we know about the men who actually sat inside the factories and waged the battle against 
the industrial giant.  This research will relate the strikers’ story while also investigating where 
their political sympathies most likely laid and how the world around them before, during, and 
after the strike affected their lives and their memories of the strike.
The most vital resource for much of this thesis came as a result of the Labor History 
Project at the University of Michigan, Flint.  During the 1970s and 1980s historian Neil Leighton 
spearheaded an effort to collect and preserve interviews conducted with strike participants.  The 
interviews give the best account of the strike and cannot be ignored when writing about the 
event.  Leighton later wrote that he embarked on the project because the histories of the strike 
that have been written did not cover the local experience.  “Most accounts of the strike were 
produced by white, middle-class, male professions…even if sympathetic to the striker’s cause, 
6they did not work in the plant, were not residents of Flint, and often had their own ideological or 
political axes to grind.”1
The story of the strike, the struggle of the workers, and the truth that lay behind all of the 
histories that have been written intrigued me from early on in my studies.  I myself am a native 
of Flint, my father retired after thirty years inside the GM factories, which are also filled with my 
uncles, aunts, cousins, and friends.  Most interesting to me was the fact that both of my 
Grandfathers worked for GM at the time of the Sit-Down Strike and both participated in some 
capacity.  My maternal Grandfather, Russell Hayes, was inside Chevy #4 and has his name on 
the strike monument in Flint.  My paternal Grandfather, James Harrington, worked for AC/Delco 
at the time and, although that particular plant was not involved in the strike, he was a picket 
around the struck plants while he was not working.  In writing this thesis I had to confront and 
deal with my own family’s memories and ideas that swirled around the strike, and as a Flint 
native I also had to overcome the bias toward the UAW that I was raised on.  However difficult I 
may have thought that would be, it turned out that the truth that I found did not make the strikers 
or their actions (including my own grandfathers’) any less heroic, nor did the idea that they may 
have been sympathetic toward Communists tarnish the memory of their actions.  In fact, 
knowing and understanding the truth, not only about the strike itself but also about the city of 
Flint, the politics of the day, the working conditions the workers faced, and the prejudices waged 
against them, all made me appreciate the Sit-Down Strike even more.
There has been much written on the strike over the years, and the most generally 
recognized work was done by historian Sidney Fine in 1969 entitled Sit-Down.2 Fine conducted 
                                                
1 Shaun S. Nethercott and Neil O. Leighton, “Memory, Process, and Performance,” The Oral History 
Review, 18, no. 2 (Autumn, 1990):  44.
2 Sidney Fine, Sit-Down:  The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937 (Ann Arbor:  The University of Michigan 
Press, 1960).
7interviews with some of the strike participants, but his book predated the interviews from the 
Labor History Project.  Fine also took a sweeping view of the strike itself, looking at General 
Motors, the history of Flint, and the formation of the union.  Fine also had written a lengthy three 
volume biography on Governor Frank Murphy, who was the governor of Michigan during the 
Sit-Down Strike.  While most would agree that having Governor Murphy in Lansing at the time 
of the strike was helpful to the union, in truth, Fine gave Murphy a lot of credit for the victory in 
Flint, which is exaggerated.  William Weinstone, who was head of the Communist Party in 
Michigan during the strike, stressed after Fine’s book was released that “Murphy did not 
evacuate the workers because of their militancy and its leadership.”3  Many of those involved in 
the strike, like Weinstone, believed that Murphy acted in reaction to the situation, not as much 
heroically himself, but with his own political salvation in mind, avoiding blood on his own 
hands.
Fine also tended to brush over the political and social upheaval occurring in Flint before, 
during, and after the strike, not giving too much attention to the political leanings of the rank and 
file workers, let alone the leaders of the strike.  An unflattering book review in The Nation stated 
that “It is a superficial work which does not analyze the class forces in the country and the 
strike,” identifying the fact that Fine ignored the ideological underpinnings of the strike 
movement itself.4  Fine also failed to address the political leanings of certain key players in the 
strike and gave small mention of important people, such as Maurice Sugar, who was one of the
key UAW lawyers in Detroit who worked behind the scenes of the strike and who also was part 
of the left-wing.  Sugar identified this slight himself in a letter that he wrote after Fine’s book 
was released that he was not surprised “that the leaflet which advertises Fine’s book Sit-Down 
                                                
3  William Weinston, interviewed by Nan Pendrall and Neil Leighton, 15 March 1979, transcript, Labor 
History Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.
4  Weinstone, interview. 
8omits my name.  Who was I anyway!”5  Sugar had every right to feel that his omission was an 
error, he was the force behind the scenes in the negotiations, and he also authored much of the 
UAW music that came out of the strike and that spurred the participants on, such as his song 
“Sit-Down!” which was sung by many of the men inside.  Perhaps this focus on politics was not 
the goal of Fine’s work, but it left a hole in the story that needs to be filled.
Many of the other accounts of the strike were written as part of a larger body of work, 
usually focusing on labor history, the auto industry, or the history of the UAW.  Most of these 
accounts came after Fine’s work and they used and cited him almost exclusively, making their 
view and account of the strike very similar to his.6  Others who have written on the strike 
included those who were either directly involved in the leadership of the strike or had a vested 
interest in the view of the union and the UAW, either negatively or positively.  These accounts, 
while interesting to read and take into consideration, were obviously biased, whether skewed by 
personal visions of heroism, self proclamation about the power of unionization, or prejudiced by 
the politics of the Cold War.7
There are also a number of works that addressed the issue of politics in the formation of 
not only the auto union but in industrial union formation in general.  Roger Keeran wrote an 
important article in 1979, and later a book in 1980, about the impact of the Communist Party on 
the auto unions.  Keeran did extensive research and looked at the auto union’s growth from 
                                                
5 Letter to friends Carl and Lucy,  2 July 1970, Maurice Sugar Collection, Box 25, Folder 4, Walter Reuther 
Labor Archives at Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.
6 See:  Steve Babson, The Unfinished Struggle: Turning Points in American Labor, 1877-Present (Lanham:  
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999);  John Barnard, American Vanguard:  The United Auto Workers During 
the Reuther Years, 1935-1970 (Detroit:  Wayne State University Press, 2004).
7 See: Richard O. Boyer and Herbert M. Morais, Labor’s Untold Story (New York:  United Electrical, Radio 
and Machine Workers of America, 1955); Sol Dollinger and Genora Johnson Dollinger, Not Automatic:  Women and 
the Left in the Forging of the Auto Workers’ Union (New York:  Monthly Review Press, 2000); Irving Howe and B.J. 
Widdick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New York:  Random House, 1949); “Parson Jack” Johnston, Labor Dangers 
of the C.I.O. Movement (Columbia, GA:  Self Published, 1937);  Sidney Lens, Left, Right and Center:  Conflicting 
Forces in American Labor (H. Regnery Co., 1949);  Edward Levinson, Labor on the March (1938, Reprint New York:  
University Books, 1956).
9infancy and how the leadership was always entwined with the Communists.  Even though 
Keeran did write some about the Sit-Down Strike, he focused on the leaders, who were known 
Communists, and did not look very closely at the rank and file workers in Flint.  His book mostly 
focused on what was happening in Detroit outside of the Sit-Down Strike and looked very little 
at the activities and political culture of Flint and its workers.  Others who have written on the 
Communist involvement in the labor movement also tended to focus on Detroit and ignore Flint 
itself, while having a definite slant either for Communism (because they were members of the 
Party) or against it.8  For this reason, it is important to look at how the politics of the day could 
have affected the men working for GM in Flint during the 1930s.
Much of the history of the strike is mired in the preconceived notions of Communism that 
developed in America soon after the Bolshevik Revolution.  These misconceptions only 
intensified after the Sit-Down Strike and into the Cold War.  Many have downplayed the 
popularity of the Communist Party among the autoworkers because most of the strikers either 
denied any affiliation or refused to discuss it.  The men all seemed to be hesitant to even 
associate anyone from the strike with Communism and events show they had good reason to 
withhold that information.  The circumstances that surrounded the workers before, during, and 
after the Sit-Down strike would definitely have an effect on the workers and their collective 
memory.  Not only did many have their lives threatened by vigilante groups such as the Black 
Legion and the Flint Alliance, but the UAW itself also began a strict policy of clearing 
Communists from their union roles soon after the strike was won.  Even forty to fifty years after 
                                                
8 See:  Roger Keeran, “Communist Influence in the Automobile Industry, 1920-1933:  Paving the Way for 
an Industrial Union,”  Labor History, 20, no. 2 (1979); Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers’ 
Unions (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); William Z.  Foster History of the Communist Party of the
United States (New York:  Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968).
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the strike these men recognized the fact that any affiliation they may have had with the 
Communist Party was something that they needed and wanted to suppress. 
The truth was that the Communist Party in America did not represent the threat to 
American Democracy in the way that most Americans feared.  The Communists who worked in 
labor and with the autoworkers would have been pushing for the same things that all the other 
unions were:  equality, better working conditions, fair pay, seniority, and union democracy.  All 
of these objectives fell right in line with what the rank and file men were fighting for.  The 
autoworkers were also largely ignored or mislead by other political groups or labor organizations
such as the New Deal Democrats and the American Federation of Labor.  The only group that 
listened to them and reached out to help them achieve their goal of an industrial union was the 
Communist Party.
There were many reasons why the autoworkers needed an ally and fought so hard for 
union representation in 1936.  One of their reasons for striking had to do with wages.  There is a 
lot of discrepancy about the exact amount that the men in Flint working for GM made in 1936.  
Different sources claim different amounts.  What the sources all confirm, however, is that it was 
not enough for the working man to sustain a living, provide for his family, and in most cases, the 
autoworkers in Flint during the depression lived under very harsh conditions.  As historian John 
Barnard stated “The claim that the auto workers had risen to middle-class levels of comfort, 
convenience, and consumption by the end of the ‘prosperity decade’ is more myth than reality.”9  
Housing the autoworkers in Flint had always been an issue for the auto giants, as the city 
outgrew itself quickly with the great influx of migrant workers.  In 1910, as Ford was recruiting 
workers to come up from the south, Flint actually built a tent city to house the great number of 
incoming workers.  At this time, they were mostly men who were either single, or who would 
                                                
9 Barnard, 27;  Dollinger, 123-124;  Fine, 61.
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work and then visit their families in the south.  By the 1930s, however, these migrant workers 
had established roots in Flint, and had brought or acquired families in the area.  Most of them 
lived with their families in small, unheated shacks, and those who had a decent home could not 
afford to buy it.  As a majority of the strikers indicated in their interviews, they were forced to 
rent.10
GM always publicized that they offered some of the highest wages in industry during the 
Great Depression.  While in many ways this claim was true, there were so many things that 
affected the actual yearly income of the autoworker.  Most of the autoworkers did not work year 
round, as the plants were subject to close with any slowdown, any break down of equipment, and 
most notably, each factory had a time during the year where it had to shut down completely 
(usually for months at a time) to switch over the whole line for the next year’s models.11
The workers were also subject to arbitrary lay-offs, as the factories were managed and 
run by local foremen who made the decision about who worked each day.  Many strikers told 
stories about losing their jobs for the summer to a foreman’s son who had come home from 
college and needed a job.  During the depression especially, when work in Flint was so scarce, 
many men would show up each day, whether they were told to work or not, and they would wait 
on the front lawn to be called in to work for a couple of hours.  When the line went down 
because of a mechanical breakage, the men would have to stay and wait for the line to come back 
up, and while they had ‘down-time’ they were no longer on the clock.  The workers stood there 
for hours on end, waiting just to have the chance to work and get paid.12
                                                
10 Dollinger, 123;  Fine, 61, 102; Striker Interviews, Labor History Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.
11 Fine, 27;  the auto factories still have yearly shut-downs due to change-over, as the daughter of a GM 
employee, I know that every July my dad got two weeks of vacation since now the changeover can be done much 
quicker.
12 Dollinger, 124;  Barnard, 27.
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Another part of the wage system that hurt the autoworkers was the piece-rate system that 
existed in Flint.  This was a way to ‘reward’ production on the line by paying everyone a flat rate 
of pay and then giving them an incentive piece-rate earned on each piece produced.  While this 
may seem like a great way for GM to reward the hard workers, it was not easily constructed, and 
overall GM made it so difficult to understand that most men had no idea what they were making
or how much they were losing using this new system.  When you coupled this system with the 
dreaded ‘speed-up,’ which was listed among one of the most important reasons for the Sit-Down 
Strike, you can understand why the piece-rate system did not work. 13
The speed-up of the line was another way for GM (and the other auto manufacturers) to 
get more production out of fewer workers.  Basically the foremen would do time trials with the 
men, see how much they could produce in an hour, and then set a quota above that as incentive 
to make them work more.  The foremen would then set the speed of the line’s movement based 
on this quota.  This created conditions that most autoworkers were unable to keep up with on a 
regular day-to-day basis.  Strikers remembered coming home with arms so sore they could not 
even sit up at the table and eat, while others ended up in insane asylums, having cracked under 
the constant pressure to keep up.  During the depression, with so many men out of work and a 
crowd of men in front of the factory waiting for a chance to come in and work a few hours, few 
men had the courage to stop the line, slow it down, or even complain.  A common thread through 
all of the striker interviews was their memory of the foremen at one point or another taking them 
or a fellow worker over to the window and showing them the crowd of men waiting to take their 
spot on the line, who would not complain about the speed of the work.  For men trying to feed 
their families, this was enough incentive to stay on the line and endure the punishment.  There is 
a story handed down in my family about my grandfather who had worked for Ford before going 
                                                
13 Fine, 62.
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to work for GM during the strike.  The reason that he left Ford was because he was denied a 
bathroom break and was told by his foreman to ‘go where he stood.’  Genora Johnson Dollinger 
stated in her book that “they used to say, ‘Once you pass the gates of General Motors, forget 
about the United States Constitution.’”14
The auto barons themselves did not have much respect for the autoworkers, in many 
cases they viewed them as an expendable commodity that could easily and often be replaced.  
This was evident in their lack of any type of seniority system, dismissing men on a daily basis.  
Henry Ford himself once said that the autoworkers “must be skilled in exactly one operation 
which the most stupid man can learn within two days…I could not possibly do the same thing 
day in and day out, but to other minds, perhaps I might say to the majority of minds, repetitive 
operations hold no terrors.  In fact, to some types of mind thought is absolutely appalling…the 
average worker, I am sorry to say…above all…wants a job in which he does not have to think.”15
The idea that the autoworker was, at best, simple-minded, helped the auto manufacturers 
to excuse some of their more underhanded practices which they used to not only control their 
worker, but to keep them from organizing a union.  The auto barons, such as Ford and GM, made 
it their mission to keep unions out of the industry, even forming an Employers’ Association in 
Detroit which provided scabs to work in plants during strikes, and most notably offered spies to 
infiltrate the plants and the unions to compile lists of union men and Communists.  Between 
1934 and July of 1936 GM reportedly spent one million dollars on labor spies through the 
Pinkerton National Detective Agency.  The LaFollette Committee also found that by the summer 
of 1936 three of thirteen board members of the AFL union in Flint were recruited worker spies 
                                                
14 Dollinger, 125; Interviews.
15 Barnard, 18.
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for GM, while two more were actually hired Pinkertons.  Under these conditions it is not hard to 
understand why no one trusted the AFL union in Flint, or even dared to talk about unionization.16
There were many other problems that the workers in Flint, specifically, had to deal with.  
All of which stemmed from the fact that because Flint was built around one industry, and mostly 
one manufacturer, GM, it was a company owned and run town.  The city officials in Flint were 
all associated with the company.  For example, Chief of police James V. Wills had been a Buick 
detective, and the mayor himself, Harold Bradshaw, had also worked for the company.  Most of 
the judges and the county prosecutor all owned stock in GM, making their opinions against 
strikes and the workers very biased.    Nearly eighty percent of the families in Flint relied on GM 
for their income, in one form or another.  The city itself depended on the running of the plants 
and the employment of the workers.  GM also had control of the radio stations, the newspaper,
and all media outlets in the city, denying the union access to their resources.17
Above all else, by 1936 the workers were fighting for true collective bargaining.  GM 
would not deal with the workers as a whole unit, nor on a national scale.  Their primary 
argument during any strike would be that each plant was managed locally, and therefore each 
grievance must be settled with local negotiations.  Companies like GM saw the danger in letting 
the autoworkers organize on a national level, they understood the amount of power this would 
give to the collective workers, which was why they fought so hard against it.  This was also why 
the union decided to strike in Flint and cause a national shut-down.  They hoped that this would 
force GM to negotiate with them on the national level as a collective group.  While the union did 
eventually acquire exclusive collective bargaining rights, they did not come directly after the Sit-
Down Strike, but as a result a while later.  The UAW did, however, force GM to negotiate with 
                                                
16 Barnard, 30; Fine, 38, 39, 41.
17 Fine, 108, 106.
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them as a collective group of factories that went on strike, and this would lead to an expansion 
on the national level.
The workers and UAW leaders in Flint would face many challenges in the days leading 
up to the strike and all during the strike.  Yet, most would agree that their actions were necessary 
and that the strike had to come to a place like Flint, where GM was king.  Not only were the 
factories in Flint vital parts of GM’s operation, but also a victory here would show a symbolic 
weakening of the auto giant.  The Sit-Down Strike still lives on in Flint, its legacy sometimes 
overshadowing its own importance.  There is a large monument to the strike behind the UAW 
local, and each year on February 11 the men in the factories still wear a white shirt to 
commemorate the end of the strike.  Rarely can you pick up a copy of the shop paper in Flint and 
not see an article or blurb that is dedicated to some aspect of the Sit-Down Strike.  It has become 
a part of Flint, even as the auto giants have pulled up stakes and moved out of the area, leaving 
vast amounts of people out of work, with nothing to see but vacant factories which once housed 
the city’s heroes.  
This study is not intended to tarnish that memory but to enhance it by understanding the 
strike itself through the eyes of the average worker.  It explores the men’s views and memories 
of the strike itself, followed by their history and association with different political groups.  
Finally it confirms the challenges the men faced as union men and the prejudice they faced for 
their affiliation with left-wing groups, such as the Communist Party.  In the end it is easier to see 
not only what the autoworkers in Flint went through before, during, and after the Sit-Down strike
but to also understand how their experiences shaped their political beliefs and how they 
remembered their own affiliations once the strike was over.  Overall, it is clear that the men as a 
group had little open hostility for the Communist leaders of the strike, and because the 
16
Communists were the only group listening to the rank and file workers and helping them 
unionize their industry, there is a strong likelihood that many secretly supported or sympathized 
with the Communist Party during the strike. This information was only muted and suppressed by 
the workers because of the dangers and prejudice that surrounded the idea of Communism in 
America during the 1930s and later on.
17
CHAPTER 2
THE STORY OF THE SIT-DOWN STRIKE
“Why must men in the world’s most perfect Democracy have to take such steps to 
survive?”18 These were the words of Fisher Body #2 Sit-Down striker Francis O’Rourke, who 
kept a detailed diary during the Flint Sit-Down Strike.  O’Rourke told one of the only firsthand 
accounts of what occurred during the forty-four days of the strike, and he detailed in it how he 
and the other men felt and how they passed their time inside the plant.  In the 1970s, the Labor 
History Project at the University of Michigan in Flint conducted interviews with strike 
participants.  These interviews with elderly people forty years removed from the event are very 
important to understanding the actual events of the strike as remembered by those who lived it 
day by day.  While time may have made some of the details fuzzy, the participants had retold this 
saga many times over forty years.  For most it was the most exciting and important time in their 
life.  
The story of a strike itself is always tricky to decipher.  One must look at each person’s 
perspective, which side of the fight they were on, and what were their political affiliations.  One 
other factor that seems to have clouded the memory of some of the participants had to do with a 
vision of personal triumph and heroism.  Many of these men and women lived the rest of their 
lives basking in the glory of the events in Flint that winter, while many others may remember 
that individual’s part as being somewhat small and insignificant.  All of these factors definitely 
had an effect on the men and women who recalled the strike and the story they told.  It is still 
very important when studying the history of the Sit-Down Strike to use the memories of the 
                                                
18 Francis O’Rourke Diary, 12-31-36, Box 1, Labor History Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.
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participants themselves because they have a different understanding and recollection of events 
than the people who witnessed the strike as an outsider.
The Sit-Down Strike officially began in Flint the morning of 30 December 1936 in the 
Fisher Body Plant known at the time as Fisher Body #2.  The men arrived at work that morning 
around six a.m., just as any other day.  Francis O’Rourke noted that at seven a.m., there was 
mass chaos, and men were hollering and screaming about shutting the line down, which all 
seemed to surprise the men.  He later shared the information that the foreman had told three 
inspectors to remove their union buttons or be fired, claiming that they were in training for 
management, and therefore could not have union affiliation.  When the inspectors refused, the 
foreman fired them.  This prompted the union leaders in the shop to yell for the men to shut the 
line down and stay put.19
Men who were identified as being the leaders of the initial strike movement in Fisher 
Body #2 that morning were Maynard “Red” Mundale and Bruce Manley.  Other men who were 
perhaps greatly involved with the union movement at the time, such as William T. Connolly, 
remembered that the union had really pre-planned the strike itself.  Mundale stated that they 
knew that Fisher Body #2 was union strong; he believed they were eighty percent organized by 
30 December.  Therefore, the night before the strike the union held a meeting at the Pengelly 
Building (United Auto Workers or UAW headquarters in Flint) where Robert Travis, UAW 
organizer in Flint at the time of the strike, told the union men that a factory in Cleveland had just 
sat down and “the iron was hot”.  In other words, Mundale believed that the UAW was telling 
them to take Fisher Body #2 down.  They all voted to wear their union buttons into work the next 
morning.  They knew that this would create some kind of disturbance in the plant, which would 
                                                
19 Francis O’Rourke Diary, 12-30-36;  Fred Ahearn, interviewed by John DeYonker, July 1978, transcript, 
Labor History Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.
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allow them the opportunity to call the strike and sit down.  This idea of pre-planned action is 
collaborated in the account told by other Fisher Body #2 workers, such as Fred Ahearn and 
Elmer “Red” MacAlpine.  A strike was looming and it seemed very evident that the conditions 
were right.  When Travis questioned Bud Simons, the leader of the strike in Fisher Body #1, 
about whether or not the men in Flint were ready for a strike, Simons replied, “they’re like a 
pregnant woman in her tenth month.”20  The average man, union or not, could probably sense the 
tension building in the factories.  Union leaders, such as Mundale, would have known about 
plans initiated to light the spark that started the fire.  There is a question that seems to remain in 
regards to how planned the Sit-Down actually was.  Many of the men who participated probably 
had no prior knowledge of the plan, yet union leaders may have planned to wear their union 
buttons on that day, hoping to kick-start their plan for a strike into action.21
Once the strike began, there was no stopping the men.  Connolly and Mundale both 
recalled that management immediately requested that the men send two representatives to the 
employment office to meet with the plant manager.  The men sent Mundale and Manley as their 
representatives, and Mundale claimed that the two men sat in the office and waited quite a long
time for the plant manager to arrive.  As they sat there, they soon realized that not only was the 
plant manager not coming, but plant security guards were gathering in the hallway right outside 
the door, waiting to come in and force the leaders out of the building, hoping to end the strike.  
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The two men quickly forced their way out and back into the plant with the rest of the union 
men.22
From all accounts, the beginning of the Sit-Down Strike in Fisher Body #2 was frantic 
and chaotic, with some men not quite understanding what they should be doing or what was 
going to happen.  Connolly and Mundale stated that union leaders in the plant immediately held 
a meeting and that the men voted to stay in.  Sit-Down Strikes before theirs, such as in Atlanta, 
had only lasted over night, so it is plausible to believe that some men expected to be leaving in 
the morning.  O’Rourke’s account in his diary from 1 January described the men as “drawn, pale, 
tired, and anxious.”  He lamented that day that he hoped the end was in sight, indicating that the 
men did not anticipate staying inside for forty-four days.23
Distinctly different versions exist of the union organizing the strike in Fisher Body #2 
after the strike came.  Mundale claimed that the union did not assist and that neither Travis nor 
the Reuther brothers gave them instructions of any kind; that the 250-300 men inside Fisher 
Body #2 who initiated the strike figured out how to organize themselves on their own.24  Travis 
and Charlie Killinger remembered things differently, claiming that at midnight the first night of 
the Sit-Down Strike the union leaders held a secret meeting in which UAW leaders gave the men 
instructions on how to organize and conduct the strike in each plant.  The reason that this may be 
denied or conveniently left out of Mundale’s account is because Travis and Killinger, who 
themselves were members of the Communist Party at the time, claimed that the instructions were 
compiled for the men by William Weinstone, head of the Communist Party in Michigan.  
Mundale himself was not a communist and repeatedly claimed that Fisher Body #2 was not a 
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radically led plant, the men, he claimed did not receive support from Travis or the union very 
much throughout the strike.  Bud Simons, who was also a member of the Communist Party, 
retold the same story as Travis and Killinger, claiming that the strike leaders of each plant 
received instructions from the union on how to organize the strike.  These accounts are prime 
examples of how personal politics created discrepancies, making it difficult to know which 
version is the truth.  It seems logical that the union and therefore the Communist Party organizers 
would have given instructions for organization since it would have been a large task for an 
inexperienced working man to organize three hundred men living in a factory for forty-four 
days.25
Fisher Body #2 may have the distinction of being the first plant in Flint to sit-down, but it 
was not the only one.  Around ten p.m. on the night of 30 December, Fisher Body #1 joined the 
strike.  The majority of the men interviewed stated that they knew about the strike before it came 
to Fisher Body #1, that it was not a spontaneous event.  The leaders of the strike and of the union 
men in Fisher Body #1 claimed that the union was stronger in this plant than any other plant in 
Flint.  Robert Travis himself was in charge of the union drive in Fisher Body #1 and worked 
closely with the union leader inside the plant, Bud Simons.  Fisher Body #1 was also home to 
strike experienced men who had been involved in union strikes in Flint and other cities in 
Michigan since the late 1920s.  All of these factors suggest that perhaps the union had expected 
Fisher Body #1 to go out on strike before Fisher Body #2 did so that morning, thinking that
Fisher Body #1 was more prepared to strike.  That would account for the men in Fisher Body #1 
claiming to have known about the strike days, even weeks in advance, while even the leaders in 
Fisher Body #2 claimed to only hear about striking the night before.
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The majority of the men from Fisher Body #1 knew in advance of the coming strike.  
Even those not deeply involved in union affairs, such as Cecil Hendricks and Louis Gancsos, Sr., 
stated that they knew that it was coming that night through plant rumors.  Bud Simons gave a 
clear picture of why the union felt that Fisher Body #1 had to go on strike that night, even before 
Fisher Body #2 had gone down.  Two glass factories (the Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company 
and the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company) which supplied all glass for GM vehicles were 
conducting a strike and both already had been out for quite some time.26  The union leaders knew 
that these particular factories were the suppliers for GM vehicles and that in the near future GM 
was going to run out of glass and would have to close their shops in Flint and lay off workers.  If 
this happened, the UAW would have missed its opportunity to strike and cripple a working GM 
facility in Flint.27  According to Simons, for that reason, union leaders made the decision to take 
Fisher Body #1 down that evening, but they needed a plan in order to convince the men inside 
and to inspire them to sit in.  Simons claimed that the leaders decided that another union man 
from Fisher Body #1 named Bert Harris would enter the union hall in front of the men, when 
union leaders called them together for a special meeting during their dinner break around nine 
p.m. that evening.  Harris was to announce that GM was planning to remove the dies (the 
essential molds used to make the car parts) from Fisher Body #1 to a factory outside of Flint in 
light of recent strike events at Fisher Body #2.  That would have been a critical move for GM, 
and would have made any strike at Fisher Body #1 ineffective because GM would have had the 
essential tools to restart production at another location.  When Bert Harris announced this, the 
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men all voted to conduct a sit-down upon returning from dinner at Fisher Body #1.  There are 
many still associated with the strike, including Bert Harris, along with other strikers from Fisher 
Body #1 who contend that GM was in fact moving the dies out of the factory that evening.  
Harris contended that he in fact called the strike at Fisher Body #1 by his disclosure to union 
leaders that GM was moving the dies out of Flint.  Some may attribute this discrepancy to the 
fact that Harris was very clear on the fact that he was against the Communist Party and any union 
leader who may have been affiliated with the CP, such as Simons. Many concluded that Bert 
Harris was also a member of the Black Legion during the time of the strike, which was an anti 
Communist vigilante group.  It may also be an example of Harris’s heroic view of himself and 
his participation in the strike many years later.  Explanations from strike leaders, such as Simons, 
and GM denying that they were planning to move the dies, shed doubt on the assertion that GM 
was planning to remove the dies from the factory that night.28
Regardless the beginning, the strike at Fisher Body #1 had immediate effects.  Striker 
Elden Coale declared that he was not even at work on second shift that evening but was at the 
union hall waiting for a signal from the men after dinner.  Once the union leaders knew that the 
men had taken the factory, first shift workers such as Coale flooded to the factory and climbed in 
through the windows to join their comrades.  GM also felt the effects of the strikes in Flint 
immediately.  Other factories began to shut down because of lack of parts as early as the very 
next day.  For the men inside, waking up the next morning in the factory brought a sobering 
                                                
28 Louis Gancsos, Sr., interviewed by William Meyer, 5 March 1980, transcript, Labor History Project, 
University of Michigan, Flint, MI.; Cecil Hendricks, interviewed by Kenneth West, 17 April 1980, transcript, Labor 
History Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.; Bud Simons, interview; Hugh Albert “Bert” Harris, interviewed by 
Neil Leighton, 22 August 1979, transcript, Labor History Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.; Ken Malone, 
interviewed by Henry Kraus and Neil Leighton, 29 July 1986, transcript, Labor History Project, University of 
Michigan, Flint, MI.;  Charles Killinger, interviewed by Neil Leighton, 6 August 1979, transcript, Labor History 
Project, University of Michigan, Flint, MI.; “Labor:  Strike-of-the-Week,”  Time Magazine, December 21, 1936; Fine, 
145.
24
reality.  O’Rourke expressed the heartache of this reality in his daily diary entry as he wondered 
how his family felt about welcoming friends to their New Years Eve party without him.  He 
lamented, “What will happen today?  I hope it will be over.”29
One of the first things that the men ordered, within the first few hours, was that all the 
women leave the plant.  Both factories had female employees who worked in the cutting and 
sewing rooms.  Although some men asserted that these women were hard workers and even 
strong union participants who would have stayed and fought alongside the men, none of the men 
believed that it would be proper for the women to stay inside the factories.  Some of the women 
were married and mothers, while most of the men were married and fathers. Most wives would 
have never supported their husbands sitting in a factory with women because it was hard enough 
for a majority of the men to convince their wives that this was a noble cause and that they were 
not in there boozing and womanizing.30  
By 2 January, reality was setting in, and so was a sort of routine.  On the inside, the men 
began to realize that their time inside the factories may not be as short lived as they had hoped.  
They began to form committees, which gave each man a task or job to perform, whether it was to 
provide the men with a shave and haircut or patrol the factory as a patrolman.  They established 
rules of conduct and even formed a kangaroo court that held trials against offenders of the rules.  
Offenses that could have gotten you brought before the court included drinking alcohol, 
damaging machinery, being disrespectful of others, or shirking your assigned duties.  
Punishments often included cleaning a specific part of the factory or in a severe case, the leaders 
would remove you from the factory.31
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The men inside were quick to judge those they suspected might interfere with their strike 
or be spying on them for GM.  Cloyse Crane was a striker in Fisher Body #2 who happened to be 
a line inspector and had been a member of the union for six months prior to the sit down.  He 
recalled that he stayed inside with the men after the strike occurred, but after three days he was 
called before the kangaroo court and ordered to leave the shop because he was too close to 
management and a company man and they were afraid of where his loyalties might lie.  It may 
seem ironic that an inspector, which was the position of the three union men fired that sparked 
the strike, might be suspected of treachery by the men.  However, when examining the past in 
regards to union infiltration by GM spies and Pinkerton agents, it is easy to understand why the 
men had misgivings.  Crane himself admitted to no hard feelings and stated that he left and went 
to union headquarters to see how he could help from the outside.  He brought the men food and 
worked the pickets through the rest of the strike.32
The reason that the inside perspective of the men is so important in contrast to the reports 
of those on the outside is because there are details we get only from those who were inside the 
plant.  One such detail of everyday life inside revolved around the issue of whether or not the 
men were able to leave the factory or have visitors come to them.  The men inside almost all tell 
stories of leaving the factory through windows, climbing down fire escapes, jumping over barbed 
wire fences, or running three blocks in the middle of the night.  Their reasons for leaving varied 
from homesickness, to family emergency, or even boredom.  Ahearn, at Fisher Body #2, 
recounted how he left the plant for two days because he had gotten word that his wife and child 
had been evicted, while Connolly explained that he left about twice a week just to get out of the 
factory and break up the monotony.  Cecil Hendricks explained that many men, like himself, 
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were sent out by the union on specific jobs for days at a time and then allowed to reenter the 
factory.  The system that was set up involved the strike leaders issuing a strike identification card 
to each man and a pass that allowed them to go in and out of the factory.  The union leaders 
thought they could control who was coming in by checking the identification of each man.  Not 
all men were simply trying to get out; some were trying to get in even though they were not 
workers at that particular factory.  Andrew Havrilla, who was a worker at Chevy #4, which did 
not go on strike until 1 February, recalled one such story.  Havrilla declared that he would go and 
sneak into the Fisher plants during the month of January to provide relief for men who might 
have needed to go home or attend to personal business. Such details of the strike were only 
known by the men inside who actually participated in the strike.33
There is also an area of distinct discrepancy in the story told by the men inside and that of 
GM or city authorities, which has to do with the destruction of property inside the factories 
during the Sit-Down Strike.  The men claimed that one of the most important things to them was 
to protect the machinery and keep the factory itself clean.  Connolly explained that his job inside 
the factory was to patrol, much like a guard.  Part of his job was to make sure that there was no 
one who was not supposed to be there inside the factory, to watch for any disturbances, but most 
importantly to make sure that the men were not damaging the property and were keeping their 
area clean.34
The reason that the men realized that it was so important to keep the machines oiled and 
in good working order was so that once the strike ended, they could return to work as soon as 
possible.   They also understood that they had an important stake in the factory and they took 
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pride in its well-being.  While the men admitted there were a few bad apples who did do minor 
damage to property, overall the strike leaders dealt with these radicals because the men 
approached the strike in a very businesslike manner.  O’Rourke related in his diary that when the 
Sheriff came and read the injunction to them on 2 January that he was not even aware of the fact 
that what they were doing was illegal, that they felt they had just as much right to be on the 
property as the owners did.35
GM later painted the men and their attitude toward the factory in a much different light 
when they reported to Congress that Fisher Body #1 “was a scene of wanton destruction, filth 
and disruption that required many days of maintenance work…”.36  While the men inside the 
plant and union leaders admitted to some of the claimed destruction, such as the welding shut of 
doors and the use of seat cushions for beds, most claims were denied.  The welding shut of doors 
and the use of seat cushions, along with the destruction of leather cushions for the fashioning of 
blackjacks were viewed by most as acts of necessity.  They had to protect themselves from 
invasion, and they needed a place to sleep.  As far as wanton destruction of property for the sake 
of being destructive, the men vehemently denied such acts.  GM, however, claimed that they 
destroyed the electrical system supplying power to the machinery, stopped up the toilets, cracked 
all the radiators, destroyed the lighting equipment and spit tobacco all over the floor.37
Governor Murphy’s Labor Commissioner, George A. Krogstad, was one of the few who
did tour one of the factories (Chevy #4), and when he reported back to Murphy on 9 February, he 
told a version very similar to that of the men inside the factories.  “In going through, one of the 
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first things that struck me was that some of the machinery had been covered with canvass.  Other 
machinery parts had been oiled or greased.  I asked about this.  He informed me that they have a 
crew of strikers whose job it was to protect the machinery.”38  Krogstad also described plates 
laying around with sand on them for the men to spit their chewing tobacco, and that they kept 
everything very clean and sterile, expressing that “these boys are taking their strike very, very 
seriously.”39
Outside the factories the union was busy trying to organize supporters because without 
them the men inside did not stand a chance of survival.  Across the street from the factories, Ray 
Cook owned a restaurant that the factory workers frequented on a daily basis.  He decided that he 
would not be making any profit staying open now that the strike had closed the shops, so he 
allowed the union to come in and take over the restaurant, using the facilities as a kitchen to feed 
not only the men sitting down, but also the pickets who came every day.  Travis found a chef in 
Detroit named Max Gazan, who was a union supporter, to come up and help plan the meals and 
run the kitchen.  It was a huge operation, and many of the men’s wives became involved with 
this part of the strike, not only volunteering their time to work in the kitchen, but even making 
food at home in their own kitchens and bringing it down.  Dorothy Kraus, wife of Henry Kraus 
who edited the strike newspaper the Flint Auto Worker during the strike, was identified by Travis 
as doing much of the organizational work in regards to the women and the food preparation.  
Genora Johnson Dollinger, who was the wife of Kermit Johnson who helped to lead the strike 
efforts in Chevy #4, was also identified by many as helping to organize the women, although she 
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contributed more to the Women’s Emergency Brigade, which become important later in the 
strike.40
As the strike passed the New Year holiday, it was clear that the men might be inside the 
factories for a long time, and the union needed to find a way to gather resources to continue to 
support them.  One necessity that the union had to deal with was the gathering of food.  Most 
newspapers of the day, especially the Flint Journal, which was decidedly biased towards GM, 
made the public believe that it was the minority radicals in the factory who supported the strike, 
while the average citizen in Flint was against the strikers. However, many of the strikers 
described how businesses and farms in and around Flint came and donated food and supplies.  
Because Flint was a GM town, a lot of them donated anonymously. Many, however, were proud 
to support the workers, not only in support of their cause, but also because they understood that 
the auto workers were fighting for better wages, which would mean that in the end they would be 
able to purchase more goods.  Once the strike was over, merchants who supported the strikers 
were betting that the men would remember them and be loyal to them, which is what happened 
in many instances.  Once such merchant was the Hamady Brothers Grocery store, which donated 
food weekly to the cause, and remained a strong union promoted store in the Flint area for years 
after the strike.41
The union also needed money.  The UAW was young and had recently broken with the 
larger American Federation of Labor (AFL) to join the also young Congress of Industrial 
Organization (CIO).  In order to support the effort, other more left-wing unions from the CIO 
stepped up.  Travis stated that the United Mine Workers Union donated ninety-thousand dollars, 
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while United Electrical Workers and the Aluminum Workers Union also donated significantly 
smaller amounts.  Travis also recalled that the union received both anonymous and open 
donations from wealthy individuals, even some who owned stock in GM, such as Mrs. Gifford 
Pinchot.42
  The UAW also provided manpower support by bringing reinforcements into Flint from 
Detroit, Toledo, Saginaw, and Grand Rapids to man the picket lines.  Travis appointed a man 
named Ed Cronk to organize what strikers came to call the Flying Squadrons, which became 
very important to the strike effort.  This consisted of twenty-five to thirty cars that were always 
on call for whatever the union may need them to do.  Assignments for the Squad ranged from 
picking up pickets and taking them to the factory with the lowest number of pickets to creating a 
roadblock to protect the men.  This was especially important at the time because the Bus and 
Trolley workers in Flint were also on strike, meaning that transportation around the city was very 
limited.43
Perhaps one of the most important strike supporting tools was the UAW sound car, which 
was a new innovation and the men credited it as being a game changer for the union.  A union 
leader, usually Roy, Victor or Walter Reuther, Travis, or Kraus, always operated the sound car.  
It was guarded at all times by men who rode on the running boards.  The union used it to bolster 
the moral of the men inside the factories and give the men valuable information and updates on 
negotiations.  During the Battle of the Running Bulls, which came later in the strike, the strike 
leaders used it to give instructions to the men fighting inside and out and also to bolster their 
courage and moral.44
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The union also helped to provide support for the strikers’ families, who may have 
suffered the most during the Sit-Down Strike.  The men were no longer drawing a paycheck of 
any kind, and unlike today, the UAW did not have a built-up strike fund in order to supplement 
the men’s wages during a strike.  Bills went unpaid, and the only ones at home to deal with 
problems were the women and the children.  Most men did not earn high enough wages to put 
any money aside before the strike.  Many of the men recognized the kindness and understanding 
of many people in the community during the strike.  Fred Ahearn explained that his wife and 
child were evicted for nonpayment of rent.  He left the plant for a few days to sort things out and 
said that he was able to convince his landlord to let them stay the remainder of the strike, if he 
promised to catch up on rent afterwards. This type of silent support from the community seemed 
to be more the norm, rather than the exception, as many men told similar stories.  Grocers 
extended lines of credit and families were able to survive without welfare support during the 
beginning of the strike on little or no income at all.  The union supplemented the communal 
charity by delivering coal to families in need and providing medical care as well.  Travis was 
able to get a doctor to come up from Detroit and donate his time helping sick strikers and their 
families.  Lorne Herrlich, who owned Herrlich Pharmacy in Flint, donated a total of sixty-
thousand dollars worth of medicine to the strikers and their families.  The only job that some 
volunteers had, such as MacAlpine, was going around to strike families’ homes and making sure 
they had what they needed and trying to get them help if they needed it.  This support was vital 
to the men inside the shops because most would have been unable to continue the strike if their 
family was in desperation on the outside.45
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From the very beginning the UAW national officials entered the struggle by trying to 
persuade GM to negotiate with them on a national level, since now the strike involved two plants 
in Flint, five overall (two in Detroit and one in Indiana).  Homer Martin, President of the UAW, 
sent a letter to William Knudsen, VP of GM, on 31 December requesting a meeting.  Knudsen 
did not reply specifically to Martin’s request but only answered that he received the request and 
would respond on 5 January.  Probably the reason for GM’s willingness to stall negotiations 
revolved around Judge Edward S. Black.  On 2 January, the judge issued an injunction that 
ordered the men to evacuate the plants.  GM felt certain that this injunction would force the 
UAW to order their men out of the factories.46
This certainty felt by GM management was very short lived thanks to the investigative 
skills of the UAW’s Detroit lawyers Lee Pressman and Maurice Sugar, who discovered and 
announced that Judge Black in fact owned over three thousand shares in GM, valued at 
$219,900.  Martin and the UAW not only made GM abandon their injunction from Judge Black, 
but they also requested that Judge Black be disbarred, making it a national issue.47  When 5 
January came, GM issued their usual strike response claiming that the union must negotiate with 
the local plant management.  GM would not engage in any conference with the UAW at a 
national level or while the strikers still sat inside their facilities.  At the same time Alfred P. 
Sloan, President of GM, placed a full-page advertisement in the Flint Journal against the Sit-
Down strikers, and warned his employees that the UAW was trying to steal their livelihood.48
Inside the plants, the men went from feelings of fear to boredom and they tried to find 
endless ways to entertain themselves as the first week of the strike was winding down.  
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O’Rourke reported that the men made basketballs out of rags and hoops out of old pails, trying to 
pass the time. By 5 January, however, O’Rourke claimed that the men inside had heard news of 
the formation of the Flint Alliance, which he expressed started rumors that this group of anti-
strike vigilantes would rush, bombard, and haul the men out of the factories.  He also described
how men began to give up, leaving the factories to return home, either out of fear or pressure 
from their families.49
The Flint Alliance was a group that business professionals, city officials, and GM 
management formed outside of the factories during the Sit-Down Strike to contest the actions of 
the union.  The group was led by George E. Boysen, who was a leader in the business 
community and had been on Buick’s payroll and who also went to work for GM after the strike.  
The Flint Alliance promoted itself to the media and the nation as a grass-roots movement started 
by the employees of GM and other Flint citizens who were against the Sit-Down Strike and the 
radical actions of the UAW.  They had petitions that were signed by supporters, which they sent 
on to Governor Murphy, as proof that, as they claimed, eighty-two percent of the population in 
Flint was against the strike.50
The UAW and the men inside the factories knew, however, that the Flint Alliance was 
not what it appeared to be, and was in fact a group that GM and large business leaders in the 
community funded.  In truth, the petitions themselves contained forced signatures, with many of 
the employees in plants that were still in operation being forced by their foremen to sign or face 
termination.51
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Many in the UAW even accused the Flint Alliance of being involved in more than just a 
public relations campaign.  During the strike, Wyndham Mortimer sent a letter to Bradshaw 
accusing him and the Flint Alliance of arming “gangs of vigilantes,” and announcing “to the 
press that quote we are going down to Fisher Number one plant shooting unquote.”52  The UAW 
and the strikers all viewed the Flint Alliance as a strike breaking force, ready to use violence to 
oust them from the factories.53  
The idea and usage of such a community organized group was not an isolated incident 
which occurred in this strike in Flint.  There has been research done that suggested that these 
citizens’ committees have been used by corporations many times during heated labor battles, not 
only for public relations, but also as a source of violence and vigilantyism.  Flint was a perfect 
place for just such a group to materialize because historically they seemed to appear most in a 
city where there was a single industry that dominated all business trade, where local businesses 
were reliant on that particular corporation having success.  The group painted itself to be a grass-
roots movement of the people and justified its stance against the workers and the strike by 
convincing the people that law and order had broken down, much as it did in Flint at the time of 
the Battle of the Running Bulls.54  Overall, there is little doubt that the Flint Alliance was formed 
by GM and the business community in Flint in an attempt to sway public opinion against the 
union, and as a way to break the strike itself.
Also on 5 January, GM and the City of Flint were trying to sway public opinion with the 
arrest of one of the strikers, Gerald DeMott, for carrying a concealed weapon--a homemade 
                                                
52 “Newswire from Mortimer to Mayor Bradshaw and City Manager Barringer” 1-3-1937, Frank Murphy 
Collection, Reel 108, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
53 Al Anthony, The History of UAW Local 659:  We Make our Own History (Flint, MI:  Suburban Printing, 
1993), 19; Joel Seidman, Sit-Down (Chicago:  Socialist Party, USA, 1937), 15, Sam Dolgoff Collection, Box 2, Folder 
16, Walter Reuther Labor Archives at Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; Haessler, 4.
54 Louis G. Silverberg, “ ‘Citizens’ Committees:  Their Role in Industrial Conflict,” The Public Opinion 
Quarterly 5, no. 1 (March, 1941):  17-30.
35
blackjack.  In his statement made to police, DeMott stated that he had been sitting in the factory 
but received a pass to go home.  He claimed he received the blackjack from one of the other 
strikers, that there were between eight hundred and nine hundred blackjacks just like it still in the 
factory; that nearly every man was armed.  When asked by the police officer why the men were 
all armed, he replied that they were afraid.  “Nobody knows anything out there.  They are milling 
around like a bunch of sheep and no sleep.”55  The police had definitely slanted the report against 
DeMott.  He was described as a boozing lowlife, arrested at 3:30 a.m.  Actually, he had been to 
several pubs that evening, was intoxicated, and had worked at one of the striking factories.  
However, DeMott was the exception rather than the norm, and was not a strong union man.  In a 
lucid moment, he recalled that he left the factory after the men initially sat down at Fisher Body 
#1, then came back a few days later only to be arrested by the police.  He also stated that after 
they went on strike at ten o’clock they “said no more work and so I quit.”56  
The city police continued their attack on the union and its leaders, arresting two UAW 
members after a brawl that erupted outside the Chevy plants on 6 January.  The whole incident 
started when Roy Reuther and William Carney (both CIO organizers) used the sound car to 
encourage Chevy workers to join the strike and attend UAW meetings.  According to the police, 
some of the Chevy workers came out and started fighting with the UAW supporters with the 
sound car, which resulted in someone calling the police and with the police arresting two UAW 
supporters.  Afterwards, Roy Reuther and Travis gathered three hundred and fifty UAW 
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supporters together, marched to the police station with the sound car and urged the men on, 
threatening to come into the police station and retrieve their men.  The police came out and used 
tear gas to disperse the crowd.  Soon after, to the dismay of city police, Governor Murphy 
ordered the men be released from police custody, most likely in order to prevent any further 
violence.57
On 7 January, O’Rourke recorded in his diary that “Fisher #2 gets pretty cold when the 
heat has been turned off,” which suggested that the company was now making attempts to force 
the men out.58  Living in a factory in Michigan in the middle of winter without heat would be 
very uncomfortable for the men.  Others also documented this event.  Mundale stated in his 
interview that shortly before the Battle of the Running Bulls on 11 January, that the company 
guards came up to the second floor, shut off the heat, and locked the controls.  According to 
Mundale, they had many handy men inside, and one of them simply went over, broke in, and 
turned the heat back on.59
GM VP Knudsen released a statement on 9 January, announcing that GM had offered to 
negotiate with the UAW only if the sit-down strikers evacuate their plants.  He also declared that 
the UAW refused their offer, and “insisted on further restrictions of the Corporation’s freedom of 
action.”60  Whether the men inside the plants heard of Knudsen’s announcement is questionable.   
Some recalled having radios and newspapers brought inside the factory by the end of the first 
week, while others made it sound as though they had no word from the outside.  It was obvious 
that by 10 January, the men were entrenched and had no plans of leaving.  O’Rourke lamented 
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that it was “Sunday and I’ve missed mass.  I’m sorry, but I missed mass during the World’s War 
and this is war.”61
With such strong feelings brewing in the men inside, it was no wonder that the next day, 
11 January, would bring the most violent encounter of the strike.  The UAW came to call this the 
Battle of the Running Bulls, because the police or bulls retreated or ran from the factories.  The 
whole scuffle seemed to originate with problems between the men in Fisher Body #2 and the 
company guards, who were occupying the first floor of the plant, while the men occupied the 
second.  On 10 January, O’Rourke observed that the men and the guards were getting along fine.  
The strikers gave the guards hot coffee and chatted with them regularly because both groups  
understood that each was simply doing what was necessary to keep their jobs.62  Mundale 
claimed that the men had no problems with the company guards; that after the strike started the 
strikers allowed the guards to stay on the first floor as long as they left the men alone.  There 
seemed to be no indication that the company guards themselves planned any acts of violence or 
defiance against the men.63
The events of that day, 11 January, are highly contested by the men that were actually 
inside and involved in the scuffle, the Flint City Police, GM, and the news reporters who were 
outside.  Many variations of the story exist.  It is important to consider what the men inside and 
the pickets who were involved outside actually recall happened.  Everyone agreed that the 
trouble began that day when GM made efforts to place Fisher Body #2 in what Knudsen later 
described as shut down mode.  First, GM externally turned off the heat.  Then, around six p.m. 
the company guards removed the ladder that the union used to hoist food to the men, who 
occupied the second floor of the building.   O’Rourke described how he and the men watched in 
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wonder as twenty-two company guards armed with nightsticks marched over and took their 
ladder away.  He wondered why the guards needed to be armed when the men had never given 
them trouble before.64
What O’Rourke described next may seem like a small detail; however, when considering 
the whole progression of violence that evening and when trying to answer the question of who 
was at fault, it becomes a very important detail that historians still debate.  O’Rourke observed, 
“Wonder why all the police are out in front.  See, there’s another car of plain clothes men, 
driving up to the curb.   Watch them report to those scout cars that are parked across the road.  
Do they think we would start trouble?”65  O’Rourke suggested that the police were on scene 
before any trouble erupted between the strikers and the company guards, indicating that this 
could have been a planned attack by the police orchestrated with GM, who may have instructed 
their company guards to starve out the men.  The city police would then be ready to force them 
out of the factory.66  
Whether the police were there in advance, the company guards made the decision to 
escalate the stakes even higher by locking the front gate and not allowing the union to bring food 
into the men that way.  Since the men had always felt that they had a good relationship with the 
company guards, many of the men even recalled the head guard’s name as Peterson, they 
decided to send a delegate down to request that he reopen the front door.  Most men agreed that 
the leaders sent down about fifteen strikers to the gate to speak with Peterson.   Mundale 
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identified Roscoe Rich as the leader of this group of strikers who went to speak with the guards.  
Ahearn expressed that the strikers gave the guards three minutes to open the gate or hand over 
the keys, but instead, Peterson told the men that he had lost the keys.  Towards the end of the 
three minutes, the guards fled from the gate and hid in the women’s restroom, which allowed the 
group of strikers to force open the gates.
At this point, the response of the police comes into question again.  The New York Times
reporter argued that the police showed up a little after the men were already outside with the 
other strikers, and then they only got involved because they found that four hundred strikers 
subdued the company guards.  They wanted to restore order, and reestablish the guards back to 
the gates. Many of those involved, however, gave a different account of events once the gates 
opened.  William Weinstone, head of the Communist Party in Michigan during the Sit-Down, 
recalled that he knew that the city police were planning an attack on Fisher Body #2 before it 
even occurred because he had an informant in Fisher Body #1 who knew of police plans.  “I was 
standing on the corner,” Weinstone related, “…opposite Fisher 2.  I saw the policemen come, 
saw them smash the door, saw him answered by the inside with the company guards controlling 
the door.  Shoved all the guards away.”67  Weinstone suggested that the police came in before the 
men even took the gate from the company guards, showing a planned attack on the strikers, 
rather than a response to a riot call.
The men inside Fisher Body #2, at the door when it opened, described a different scene 
than the New York Times reporter as well.  Ahearn and Connolly were at the gate, and they 
claimed that the police were outside the door as soon as it opened.  With their riot shields, gas 
masks, and helmets, they charged the gate and the men. A tear gas bomb even hit Connolly in the 
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eye while he was still inside the plant, not outside.68  Mundale also remembered that the men 
were met with police violence as soon as the gate opened and that the police were already there 
waiting.69
The New York Times reporter was not the only one who gave a different story, but also 
GM, while all the men on the inside had a consistent recollection of the events that evening.  
Still, GM and the city of Flint gave a much different account, making the union at fault, stating 
that it instigated the events that evening.  In his report to Congress, Cronin argued that Victor 
Reuther was working the sound car that evening and that he ordered the men inside to take the 
front gate from the company.  He said that only after violence had erupted did the city police 
show up to rescue the company guards inside the factory.70
The Flint Journal stated in its commemorative book written in the 1970s, based on Flint 
Journal articles from the actually strike, that at 9:30 p.m. Victor Reuther and William Carney 
arrived at Fisher Body #2 in the sound car and ordered the men inside to take the gate.  Ten 
minutes later, the men emerged from the gate, celebrating with pickets outside on the street.  The 
reporter had stated that it took minutes for the police to arrive, and that only thirty cops came at 
that time.71
Significant facts back up the story of the men inside the plant.  First, the city of Flint was 
admittedly a GM run town, with the Flint Journal repeatedly taking the side of the corporation 
over the striking men inside.  The New York Times reporter was also somewhat hostile towards 
the union, mainly because Travis refused to speak with the reporter because he was not a 
member of the Newspaper union.  Historians agree that there were obvious links between the city 
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officials who controlled the police force and GM management, so it would not be too far a 
stretch to believe that the city police were working in accord with the company.  As Homer 
Martin, the head of the UAW, later argued, the city police had no jurisdiction to come in and 
retake the gate for the company from the men.72
Second, everyone, including GM, believed that Fisher Body #1 was the strongest held 
plant, that the men in Fisher Body #2 were less radical to begin with and that towards the second 
week of the strike they were weakening inside.  Even the men concluded that they had lost many 
men before that evening.  If the police and GM were going to plan a raid on one of the plants in 
an effort to weaken the momentum of the union, they would have targeted Fisher Body #2, not 
Fisher Body #1.  
Third, the men inside, even the day before, described their relationship with the company 
guards as being friendly and one that consisted of mutual respect.  The company guards on their 
own would not have denied the men access to the front gate and food, nor would the men have 
attacked the company guards and caused them any harm.  Whether GM wanted to take the blame 
for the events that unfolded that evening, by ordering the company guards to cut the men off 
from their food source, GM management knew that they would be starting trouble that had not 
been there before that incident.
What happened next was a three to four hour riot that ended in injury for many people, 
but the seriously injured numbered twenty-four, with nineteen of them being strikers and five 
being city police.  The strikers inside and out, by most accounts, were armed only with 
projectiles and fire hoses, while the city police had rifles and tear and vomit gas.  The strikers 
had the advantage of sheer numbers because once the news of violence broke thousands came to 
the scene to participate in the riot and help the sit-downers hold their ground inside the plant.  
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“Anybody that even had the slightest idea they wanted to be union,” Mundale recalled, “they 
were comin’ down there then.”73
Ahearn stated that the union’s Flying Squadrons were working overtime that night, 
bringing men and women from all over the city to Fisher Body #2 to help.  He said that they had 
about fifteen men who came from the Fleetwood plant in Detroit who stood between the factory 
and the police, holding them off for most of the battle.  Cronin told Congress that Victor Reuther 
at one point told the men to go home and get their guns; however, there has never been any 
evidence that any of the men were armed with guns, since this would have resulted in much 
greater casualties.  In fact, all those shot were shot by police rifles, even the one police officer 
who was shot was probably caught in the crossfire.  O’Rourke wrote, “Bring up those 
hoses…stones, bottles, bricks, hinges, bolts.  Flying through the air, not much for defence but 
that’s all we have.  Some of our men are down.  Lousy, shooting a man when he has no gun.”74
The shooting did not come right in the beginning, as the police tried to evict the strikers 
with tear and vomit gas.  The strikers all believed their best defense against these attacks were to 
use the fire hoses.  Not only was it January in Michigan and very cold, but the water worked to 
diffuse the gas bombs before they had the opportunity to erupt in the men’s area.  The force of 
the hoses also worked to force the police back (whose numbers reached approximately 120).   
The strikers recalled that they did not want to fight the police; they had planned a sit-down strike 
in order to avoid the violence many of them had experienced in the past with outside protests.  
However, as the police started to retreat and shoot their rifles at the strikers, many felt as though 
this was a battle for their life.  “It was part of something you did because you had to…who wants 
to fight law that is supposed to uphold everything you stand for?” Ahearn recalled, “And who 
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wants to battle somebody or watch their close friends shot over something as asinine as a 
profit?”75
Whether they all wanted to fight, the battle on Chevrolet Avenue raged on into the night, 
with the strikers tearing apart police cars, even flipping over Sheriff Wolcott’s vehicle while he 
was still inside it.  Some of the men admitted that souvenirs they kept from that night included 
parts of police cars and pavement.  Mundale remembered one young striker who came running 
back inside the plant with half of a cop’s uniform, his gun and belt.  He told Mundale he stripped 
the cop as he was trying to crawl away under a fence.  Many cops entered the hospital with head 
injuries from the projectiles thrown from the roof of the factory that night.76
The results from the battle on Chevrolet Avenue were many.  The District Attorney in 
Flint (Joseph) issued three hundred “John Doe” warrants for all the men inside Fisher Body #2, 
and the city issued twenty-one named warrants; seven for the leaders of the union and fourteen 
for men in the hospital with injuries.  Perhaps because of the violence or the longevity of the 
strike itself, it is at this point that Governor Frank Murphy became actively and publicly involved 
in the strike.  He ordered that the sheriff spare the fourteen men, and had their warrants removed.  
He also asked that Sheriff Wolcott not act upon the three hundred “John Doe” warrants to avoid 
any further violence.  Most important, he arrived in Flint in the early morning hours of 12
January, bringing with him the National Guard to restore and maintain order in and around Flint 
until the union and GM could came to an agreement.77
The Governor called up the National Guard and had the men shipped by train, arriving in 
Flint in the early morning hours of 14 January.   Most of the National Guardsmen came from the 
Grand Rapids area, although one of them was a sit-down striker at a plant in Detroit.  The other 
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strikers all voted for him to fulfill his obligations to the National Guard and leave the plant.  The 
feelings of the Guardsmen varied greatly, but most hoped for no violence and understood the 
position of the men inside the factories, having come from working class families themselves.   
However, as Lieutenant Japinga recalled, the Guardsmen did as the Governor commanded them.  
Most of the Guardsmen formed a perimeter around Fisher Body #2 in order to prevent any 
further violence.  The Guardsmen allowed the men inside to receive food and news from the 
union, but they would not allow anyone to leave or enter the plant.  The city housed the 
remaining Guardsmen at a local school where they cleaned the floors and waited in case there 
was violence anywhere else in the city.78  
The men in Fisher Body #1 expressed that after they heard of the riot at Fisher Body #2 
they were certain that the police would next be after them.  Men in both factories stated that they 
were relieved once they heard that Governor Murphy was sending in the National Guard to 
prevent any further violence.  As far as morale of the men in Fisher Body #2, there is some 
question, because Connolly remembered that many men left after the Battle of Running Bulls, 
with only twenty-five remaining inside.  However, Ahearn stated that because they had won the 
Battle and had the Guardsmen protecting them that their morale was high.  “After the battle with 
the police, there was a close-knit unity of some of the deepest brotherhood that I’ve ever 
witnessed between men.  And rightfully so, because you had just laid your life on the line for one 
another.”79
Governor Murphy was determined to bring the two sides together and initiate talks.  In 
the wake of such violence he was finally able to convince GM officials that they must sit down 
and meet with the UAW, even if the strikers did not leave the plants.  Murphy called a 
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mandatory meeting for 14 January in his Lansing office.  Martin and Knudsen arrived, and after 
an intense sixteen-hour session they were unable to reach an agreement; however, a truce 
emerged.  The UAW agreed to remove the sit-down strikers from all five plants and GM 
promised not to remove any dies or important machinery from the plants nor would they resume 
operations at the struck plants until negotiations were complete.80
Men inside the factories knew of the planned meeting and had very high hopes that the 
two sides would end the strike quickly.  O’Rourke recalled that all the men were crowded around 
the radio and waiting for news.  On 15 January, UAW leaders informed the men that they would 
be leaving the factories so that the UAW and GM could start collective bargaining.  The plants 
were going to evacuate one at a time, with Indiana going first, then Detroit. Finally, the two Flint 
plants would leave last on Sunday, 17 January.  GM and the UAW were scheduled to resume 
negotiations on 18 January.  O’Rourke stated that he and the men were content with this 
agreement and were all ready to return to their homes.81
At the same time as Knudsen was meeting with Martin in Lansing, he was also replying 
to requests from Boysen and the Flint Alliance, who claimed to represent the majority of Flint 
autoworkers who were not involved in the Sit-Down Strike.  Knudsen informed Boysen that GM 
would also meet with him and the Flint Alliance in order to negotiate.  When the UAW in Flint 
heard of this agreement it felt betrayed by GM, since the Flint Alliance was very anti-UAW.  
The UAW also felt that this went against everything that it and the men had been fighting for, 
which was national recognition as the sole bargaining agent for the men in the factories.82
By 17 January, the UAW had already emptied out the factories in Indiana and Detroit, 
and all that remained were the Fisher plants in Flint.  O’Rourke offered a detailed account of 
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events that day.  The men were up early, dressed in their suits, shined their shoes and prepared 
for their triumphant march out.  Then, at 1:45 p.m., the sound car approached Fisher Body #2 
and announced that GM had double-crossed the men.  “We are not going to leave the plants?  
Gee!  I feel dizzy.  Not going home…General Motors would not keep an honest agreement.  
Boysen and his Flint Alliance.  This thing would have been settled long ago and we would have 
been back at our jobs were it not for them.”83
The men’s spirits were decidedly broken after they were so close to going home in mid-
January; however, they all voted to stay inside and refused to accept what they perceived as 
GM’s dirty deal.  O’Rourke wrote, “These men are sick at heart.  Now do you wonder why we 
trust no one?  Can you tell us why we should?  Is it any wonder these good men rebelled?”84  Not 
surprisingly, no one showed up at Murphy’s office on 18 January to begin negotiations. GM 
refused to meet since the UAW did not evacuate all the plants.  On 21 January, things still 
looking bleak, the United States inaugurated President Roosevelt for his second term.  In 
attendance, CIO leader John L. Lewis had some choice words for the president.  He stated that 
labor had insured him his reelection and they expected FDR to help them in their current 
struggle.  This was a bold statement indeed, even for a man as flamboyant as Lewis.  Murphy 
was now in communication with Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, and together they were slowly 
roping Knudsen and Sloan back to the negotiating table.  However, after Lewis’s statement, 
Sloan and Knudsen refused to return to the bargaining table, claiming that they saw no point in 
continuing to negotiate with the CIO.  The stalemate forced Perkins to invoke Congressional 
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power to mediate in the labor dispute, and she tried desperately to force the two sides together in 
Washington, D.C.85
Sloan and Knudsen continued to stand firm, telling the government that they would only 
meet with the UAW when the men left the factories in Flint.  FDR made a public statement in 
which he expressed his disappointment in Sloan.  Perkins began to lose her patience with the 
auto manufacturer and publicly reprimanded Sloan for his actions, stating, “The real reason the 
workers would not take their men out of the plants was that they felt they couldn’t trust General 
Motors.  An episode like this must explain to the American people and make it clear why the 
workers can’t trust General Motors.”86   Reporters were stunned by her candor and asked if FDR 
knew that she was saying this, to which she replied that the president had no idea.
Sloan continued to anger the Labor Secretary, meeting with her secretly, promising to 
return to the bargaining table, and then flying back to New York the same day, only to inform 
her that he could not meet.  This was now the end of January and no negotiation was in sight.  
Both the UAW and GM were planning their next big move.  It turned out, the UAW’s next move 
was much bigger than anything that GM had planned.87
Time itself seemed to be working against the UAW and the strikers.  During the first 
week of February GM had another injunction ordered against the strikers inside the factories 
from the reputable Judge Paul Gandola.  Coinciding with the injunction the Flint Alliance held a 
massive rally at the IMA (a GM auditorium in Flint) claiming eight thousand in attendance 
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supporting a return to work platform put forward by the company.  As a result, some of the 
strikers seemed to be losing hope inside the Fisher plants.88
The UAW, however, had a plan to effectively counteract that of management—take 
down another plant.  As diarist O’Rourke observed, the union was stronger than many believed 
and “we can call out more shops if it is necessary.”89  The most important factory still operating 
in Flint was Chevrolet Plant #4.  GM management suspected that the UAW would attempt to 
take the plant and had beefed up the security force there to prevent any such occurrence.  One of 
the UAW men in Chevy #4, Kermit Johnson, came to Robert Travis with a plan to take the plant 
in spite of the fact that the union sentiment within the plant was somewhat weak.  Johnson’s plan 
was simple enough:  trick GM into believing that the union was taking down Chevy #9, a 
somewhat insignificant plant with a strong group of UAW members.  As the men in Chevy #9 
moved to sit-down, GM would shift security forces from Chevy #4 and at the same time union 
members from Chevy #6 would aid those few union members in Chevy #4 take the plant down.90
The plan, formulated even before the judge’s injunction, was risky because if even one of 
the company’s spies (referred to as stool pigeons by the union members) found out about the 
deception he would tell management and the entire scheme would fall apart.  To prevent that 
from happening, Travis made sure that no one knew the plan except the Reuther brothers, Kraus,
and Simons.  On 31 January, Travis held a large union meeting at Pengelly with over fifteen 
hundred attendees from all the Chevy plants.  Travis alluded to the men that something was 
going to happen, that if their plant should go down that they were to stick together and sit-down.  
Knowing that there were stool pigeons in attendance, Travis decided to use them to his 
advantage.  After the meeting, he had each man come through a dark room, one at a time, and he 
                                                
88 “National Affairs:  U.S. Terror.”
89 O’Rourke 1-30-37.
90 Travis and Killinger, interview.
49
gave each a slip of paper (supposedly at random).   He picked fifteen men to come back and meet 
with him at midnight, including stool pigeons.  At that meeting he worked very hard to convince 
the men that the UAW planned to take down Chevy #9 the next day.  Travis knew that the stool 
pigeons would believe this to be real information and would pass it along to GM, only making it 
more believable the next day.91
Events the next day transpired just as the UAW had planned.  At the agreed time, men 
inside Chevy #9 began to shut down the line, ordering the men to sit-down.  Every man in Chevy 
#9 believed that they were the targeted plant.  Next, GM security came over from Chevy #4 and 
reinforced the guards at Chevy #9.  The company guards attacked the men inside Chevy #9 with 
tear gas as GM tried to prevent the UAW from taking another plant.  The newly formed 
Women’s Emergency Brigade, lead by Kermit Johnson’s wife, Genora Johnson Dillinger, 
arrived at Chevy #9 and stood between the company guards and the plant.  Each woman had a 
red beret and matching red armband, and the union had armed them with blackjack clubs that 
they used to smash open the windows in Chevy #9 to clear the tear gas filled air and allow the 
men inside to breath and fight.  As the battle at Chevy #9 raged on, with all participants certain 
they were the center of the plan, at Chevy #6 men traveled through the train tunnels that 
connected Chevy #6 and Chevy #4.  When they arrived at Chevy #4 they helped Johnson and the 
other union men shut the line down and take Chevy #4.  The union men in Chevy #4 allowed 
those who wanted to leave to do so, but most of the men estimated that between two hundred and 
three hundred men stayed in, counting the men who came over from Chevy #6.  Havrilla claimed 
that the police showed up and tried to break through the locked gate to get the strikers out, but 
the men stood strong and resolute “willing to kill ourself or them.”92
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News of the UAW victory at Chevy #4 spread quickly. On 2 February, the National 
Guard moved in and took over Chevrolet Avenue, surrounding Chevy #4.   At the same time, the 
men inside received word of Judge Gandola’s injunction, and Sheriff Wolcott gave the men until 
3 p.m. on 3 February to leave the factories.  The men sent a messenger to UAW headquarters to 
get orders from the leaders and got the signal back to “hold the fort.”93   Turns out Governor 
Murphy had asked that the injunction be set aside because he was finally getting the two sides to 
meet and resume negotiations, which could be damaged by any more violence.
After Chevy #4 fell, completely crippling GM, management decided it was time to return 
to the negotiating table.  For the men inside, things began to look very bleak.  The Guardsmen 
were now controlling everything going in and out of the factories, meaning that the men got little 
word from home or the UAW.  The Guards allowed them one mail man to whom they issued a 
military pass in order to deliver them letters from home, but the time passed slowly.  Travis 
stated that conditions in Chevy #4 were very difficult for the men; some even received food 
poisoning at one point.  O’Rourke wrote that the food supply was getting low, and that the men 
in all the factories had very little to eat.  O’Rourke noted that he had lost twenty-six pounds 
while sitting inside.94  
The men also had to deal with public opinion on the outside, and most of the word that 
came through the media was not supportive of the men or the strike.  GM may have entered 
negotiations again, but they were not keeping quiet about the effect of the strike on the men and 
women who were not part of the UAW who simply wanted to return to work.  O’Rourke 
lamented on 6 February: “We casually are laid off six to ten weeks at the end of each year.  
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Funny how no one tells how much we lose then.  But the papers are mentioning how much we 
are losing every day now.”95
There were also allegations that GM was hatching a plan to evict the strikers from Chevy 
#4.  A man named Robert Evans, who worked at Chevy #4, claimed that before the plant had 
gone on strike, he had inquired to his foreman about becoming part of plant security, but the 
foreman told him there were no openings at the time.  When the plant went down, he was not 
against the union, but was not an active member, so he left the factory.  He stated that soon after 
a man from plant management came to his house and offered him a position with plant security.  
The man told Evans to show up at a garage by the plants at a certain time.  When he arrived, the 
garage was guarded by the National Guard who had his name on a list and let him through.  
There were about sixty to one-hundred other men there, and management told them of a plan to 
drive trucks along the railroad tracks between the Chevy plants.  The men would use the trucks 
to ram the doors open, and then the men were to go inside and forcibly evict the strikers from 
Chevy #4.  Evans felt that this was a mistake, that men would be hurt, so he went and told the 
UAW of the planned attack.  The UAW instructed him to continue to attend the meetings in 
order to keep them informed.  Evans went to a second meeting, but by the time he went to the 
third meeting the guards would not allow him in, which meant that management probably caught 
him talking to the UAW.  He did not know why GM never carried out the plan; perhaps the two 
sides settled the strike before the violence erupted.96
Even though the men were weary, battered, and broken, as the end drew near they held 
fast inside the three factories.  They had hope in Governor Murphy; they believed that he was 
working to get the two sides together.  On 10 February, at 5:45 a.m., O’Rourke wrote that a 
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newspaperman named McIntyre from the Detroit News informed the men that the two sides had 
reached an agreement.  Later that same day the men got the official word from the UAW and 
they planned their march out on 11 February.  The first to leave was Fisher Body #1, then Chevy 
#4 and finally Fisher Body #2.  For O’Rourke, victory was sweet.  His final entry read “Two 
wars we’ve been through and this last one we knew what we were fighting for.”97
For other men, the end was met with relief, but also anger and bitterness.  Many of them 
had spent forty-four days locked inside a cold factory, away from their homes and families.  At 
the same time, they saw many GM workers continuing with their lives, joining organizations 
such as the Flint Alliance, and slandering the strikers around town and in the media.  As word of 
victory spread around the city, some of these same men and workers came climbing in through 
the windows of the factories, congratulating the men and then marching out in victory alongside 
the few who had actually stood their ground.98
The agreement itself was not a complete victory for the UAW, but it was an important 
beginning and led to a very strong contract between the UAW and GM, making the UAW the 
official union of the auto manufacturer, and eventually for all of the auto industry.  Initially, GM 
agreed to recognize the UAW as the sole bargaining agent for the plants that had been on strike
and promised not to enter into negotiations with any other organization while negotiating with 
the UAW.  In exchange, the UAW would evacuate all GM plants.  On 11 March 1937, the two 
sides came to a final agreement, with GM conceding that there were issues that needed to be 
dealt with and negotiated at a national level, and that they would discuss these with the UAW.99
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In Flint, the men claimed that other GM workers flocked to join the UAW and rejoiced 
with the men over the victory.  Throughout the strike the men had been drawn together through 
adversity and comradery. The UAW men wrote songs to commemorate the struggle, and the 
union men proudly marched out of the factories, through the streets of downtown Flint, ending at 
their union headquarters.  They all understood that they had changed labor history forever.
The story of the Flint Sit-Down Strike, the workers, and the UAW goes far beyond the 
victory march that day in February.  So many questions remain about the story behind the story, 
specifically what brought the men together and just exactly whom they owed for their eventual 
victory.  The UAW would grow into one of the most powerful unions in the United States, 
making the questions about its origins, along with the political leanings of its men, one of the 
utmost importance. 
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICS BETWEEN THE STRIKE
The political climate of 1930s America was a unique period in American history.  The 
fact that America was in the midst of the Great Depression greatly affected the way average 
Americans viewed their government and the future of America in general.  Many were more 
open to radical, seemingly foreign ideas, and found ways to adapt these ideas to fit into their own 
American political ideals and traditions.  The autoworkers were one such group which faced 
many political alternatives during the great unionization drive in the auto industry during this 
turbulent time.  The rank and file of the auto industry had choices to make between following the 
Communists, Socialists, Proletarians, New Deal Democrats, and even fascist groups.  Overall, 
the vision of Communism that most modern Americans share is quite different from the way that 
the Communists and Marxists operated in America during the 1930s.  In reality Communists 
were the ones who listened to the needs of the autoworkers, supported their industrial 
unionization effort, and helped them achieve real, lasting results toward collective bargaining 
during the Great Depression.  
Although many autoworkers have vehemently denied any affiliation with the Communist 
Party over the years, and the Communist Party has been left out of a lot of union histories, it is a 
known fact that the Communist Party was the most active force behind the unionization of the 
industry. What is unclear is to what extent the average rank and file worker would have 
knowingly followed a Communist movement and to what extent they may have sympathized 
with the Communist leaders.  Since most deny such involvement, it is generally accepted that 
they simply went along with the leadership either without the knowledge of their political 
beliefs, or in spite of such beliefs.  The fact that Communism received such a tarnished image 
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after the 1930s, not only on a world and national scale, but also on the local union scale, is 
greatly ignored, even though this certainly factored into the collective memory of the 
autoworkers during the Cold War, when most histories of the strike were written.  
It is important to understand all the movements that faced the autoworkers and to see how 
in fact the autoworkers rejected those movements while simultaneously being driven towards a 
more Communist tradition.  One must also look at how American Communism differed from the 
world version of Communism (particularly in Soviet Russia) and how the Communist Party 
adapted in the 1930s to win over the workers of America, not just in the auto industry but 
throughout their industrial union drive.  This involves a look at Communism and Marxism in 
America that goes beyond the official membership cards of the CPUSA (Communist Party of the 
United States of America), which actually boasted low numbers.  Most autoworkers would have 
been too scared of being red-baited to ever officially join the CPUSA, and most remained on the 
fringes.  Historian Roger Keeran stated that “only a few CP members…functioned openly as 
Communists, but many UAW members and local officers gained wide reputations as leftists who 
associated themselves with the party.”100
The Communists
Communism in America must be viewed as two separate entities, first there was the 
official party that finally emerged from years of internal strife, the CPUSA.  However, there was 
also a separate division of Communism in America, and that is the general movement to follow 
the ideas of Marxism and apply them to America, outside of the affiliation with the official party. 
The reason there was a disconnect between the official party and many Communist Americans is 
best answered by looking at how America was different from Soviet Russia and the world call to 
Communism. The CPUSA would constantly struggle to build an official party in America 
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because it followed the Comintern (or the Communist International body, based in the USSR) 
and often ignored the unique situation that existed in America.101  Many Communist followers, 
specifically some of those who were leaders in the autoworkers movement, were not specific 
followers of the CPUSA or their world view of Communism.102
The Communist Party in America had its roots in the Socialist Party, which it split from 
between 1917 and 1919.  Those who split off into the Communists were the more radical, left 
wing side of the Socialist Party, inspired by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.  From the 
beginning the Communists in America were separated into factions, one being the language 
federation and the other the labor party.  The language federations were made up of the foreign 
born party members who did not fully understand American ideologies and goals, and therefore 
wanted to base the party more on the world revolution and the needs of the foreign countries they 
hailed from.  The labor party was made up of more American born English speakers, who 
wanted to focus more on the needs of Americans, which they saw as quite different and distinct 
from the rest of the world.  This split was eventually officially repaired, and the groups joined to 
form one party by 1924; however, the question over focus and policies would always remain in 
the party.103
From the beginning of the American movement, the leaders listened and followed the 
official line from the Comintern.  This body worked for the start of the world revolution and also 
sought support for the USSR.  Many members of the Communist Party in America would not 
always agree with the Comintern, but the leaders of the national party would listen to the 
Comintern.  This is where much of the disconnect between the leaders and the followers 
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originated.  The Comintern believed that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable after World 
War One, even in the U.S., while the majority of Americans involved in the movement did not 
agree.  Those close to the party were trying to fight for better conditions for the workers, not 
push for a revolution. 104
Through the 1920s, many of the CPUSA’s goals revolved around the impending 
revolution in America, and so they worked hard to organize and rally the American workers to 
their cause by promoting industrial unionism. Many radical trade unionists, like William Z. 
Foster, were first attracted to the CPUSA through the unionization drive.  Foster had been a 
member of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) since 1909 and would go on the become 
the leader of the industrial union drive in the Communist Party.  As early as 1920, the 
Communist party and Foster had joined forces to enter the unionization drive by creating the 
Trade Union Educational League (TUEL). This industrial union worked within the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) until 1923, when the AFL finally expelled all the TUEL members for 
dual unionism.  The AFL was promoting their policy of skilled labor unions only, and thought 
that by having an industry wide union, such as TUEL, that the workers were being represented 
by two separate AFL unions.105
Even though the AFL had expelled the TUEL members, the Communist Party did not end 
their unionization drive.  By 1925 the party had changed their name to the Workers’ 
(Communist) Party, emphasizing their goal of organizing the workers in America.  The Workers’ 
Party and TUEL were involved in several different industries where they flourished in the 1920s, 
among which were the autoworkers that had begun to organize as early as 1891 under the 
Knights of Labor and then the AFL.  Their union was made up of skilled workers in the 
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International Union of Carriage and Wagon Workers.106  The Automobile Workers Union 
(AWU) developed around that same time as an industrial union.  By 1915 the AFL was 
demanding that the AWU drop the word automobile from their name.  When the AWU refused 
the AFL’s request, they were suspended by the AFL and were an independent union by 1918.107
The majority of the AWU’s leadership was based in the Socialist Party from 1919 until 
about 1924.  The union openly proclaimed their Socialist doctrine and backed Eugene V. Debs 
for president in 1920.  Their union papers published articles that were sympathetic to the USSR, 
but at the same time were openly critical of the radical, newly formed, CPUSA.  Despite their far 
leftist leanings, the AWU attracted many autoworkers, mainly because they were the only 
industrial alternative to the AFL.  In 1919 the AWU had approximately 45,000 members and 
locals all over Michigan.  However, the early 1920s were not favorable to the Socialist Party or 
unions, and by 1922 there was a great decline in membership for the AWU, with only about 800 
members nationally.108
As the AWU was falling apart, the Communist party was becoming more and more 
interested in the autoworkers.  Edgar Owens, a labor organizer for the Communists, came to the 
head of the AWU  and offered to help the fledgling union by bringing in about twenty-five 
Communist organizers.  Since the AWU was in such disarray, the Socialist leaders agreed to let 
Owen and the Communists in.  The Communist organizers worked to build the unions within the 
shops, focusing on the workers day to day problems and demands, and the Communists always 
supported the workers’ strikes, whether they were started through the AWU or not.  They also 
sympathized with the workers’ frustrations with the AFL.  Their most effective tool was the shop 
paper that they put out in every auto factory in Michigan.  Once they had successfully built a 
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Communist cell within the plant (even if it was only made up of a few workers) they would have 
them distribute a shop paper.  These shop papers not only introduced many autoworkers to the 
union, but also to American Communism.109
These shop papers were quite different from those that were distributed by the AWU 
under the Socialist Party.  The Communist papers only cost one cent, were only four pages long,
and were written by actual workers in a dialect that the workers could understand.  They also 
focused on the everyday issues of that particular factory, which made them much more relatable 
for the average worker. The Communists called for more equality in the workplace, such as for 
women and African Americans, and they avoided racial slurs. The Socialist papers, on the other 
hand, had a great disconnect from the average workers.  The Socialist papers cost about fifteen 
cents, were around sixteen pages long, and had articles written for the masses by professional 
writers and journalists.110
The AWU would officially come under the control of the Communists in 1926 when Phil 
Raymond ran against the Socialist leadership for general-secretary and won by one vote.  
Raymond was an autoworker in Detroit and would greatly change the automotive industry 
through his AWU leadership.  Once the Communists officially took over, the Socialists left the 
AWU in droves.  Between 1926 and 1930 there would be over fifty major auto strikes (mostly in 
Flint and Detroit) and the AWU would be involved in most, even though they actually started 
few.  The workers found that the AWU and Raymond were tremendously gifted organizers, but 
that their label as Communists or reds inevitably caused problems for the workers.  Many strikes 
were led by the AWU, yet the AWU and the workers experienced very few victories.  Raymond 
called the AWU “the fire department” because the workers called them in when they needed 
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help, and quickly forgot them once the strike was over.111  Even more harmful to the AWU were 
the strikes in which the workers used them to organize, then booted them out of the strike once 
the public and the company started red baiting all the workers.  Even though this may have hurt 
the image of the AWU, many of their ideas stuck among the workers, who did not forget the 
Communist loyalty when the AFL had forgotten them.  The strike movement of the late 1920s 
also helped to train and build union leaders among the AWU, and this experience would pave the 
way for the upcoming unionization effort of the 1930s.112
Another affect that the AWU had on unionization in the 1920s was that they encouraged 
the AFL to look seriously at and consider organizing the autoworkers.  The AFL was afraid that 
the AWU was gaining too much power and that the Communists could take control of the auto 
industry, so by 1926 they had decided to start a unionization drive in auto.  However, their 
efforts proved to be half hearted and more words than actions.  Phil Raymond and the AWU 
petitioned William Green and the AFL to be admitted back into the AFL, with the Communists 
arguing that they did not care who unionized auto, as long as the workers were united.  Green, 
however, quickly answered their request by telling Raymond that the AWU was welcomed back, 
if they relinquished all control over to the AFL. Raymond refused to do that, and the AWU
remained outside the AFL, and Green and his labor soldiers continued to ignore the autoworkers.  
This helped to fuel the flames of AFL resistance among the autoworkers, and the Communists 
would continually benefit from the mistakes of the AFL.113
With the end of the 1920s came one of the first major policy switches from the CPUSA 
and the Comintern.  The period from 1928-1934 became known as the Third Period, and the 
official party line stated that capitalism was surely failing in the United States, and that the 
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Communists in America needed to take a hard turn to the left and push more radical ideas on the 
American workers.  The TUEL became the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL) in 1929, openly 
promoting Communism and class warfare.  The Comintern sensed a disconnect in America 
between the official party and the rank and file workers, and it sought to bring the two in line, 
not by softening the party, but by attempting to harden the workers.  Foster began to fall out of 
favor with Moscow, and a new leader, Earl Browder, emerged, who did not have the industrial 
trade union connection with the workers.  The labor oriented members of the Communist 
movement in America were not calling for a revolution like their new leader was demanding, but 
they were fighting low wages and bad living conditions and asking for the same things that other 
unions were asking for.  For this reason, the AWU and the Communist Party in general remained 
strong among the autoworkers during the Third Period, even though many understood what the 
Comintern and CPUSA leadership did not, which was that the Great Depression completely 
weakened the position of the American worker, and that this was no time for them to take the 
upper hand or start a revolution.114
William Foster and the AWU were not pushing the revolution on the workers, and this 
allowed their union and ideologies to be accepted, even though official party line was calling for 
very radical ideas.115  Foster wrote in 1936 that throughout the industrial drive that he was 
calling for three things:  industrial unionism, rebelling against management and not accepting 
being second class citizens, and trade union democracy.  This last item would become a big 
selling point for the Communists among the autoworkers, especially when it came down to their 
decision in 1935 to stick with the AFL or move onto the newly formed Congress of Industrial 
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Organization (CIO).  The autoworkers would stay with their Communist leadership throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s because they were promoting union democracy—that each member would 
have a voice and a vote.  This idea in and of itself shows that the American Communist won 
favor by listening to the autoworkers’ needs and desires and not prescribing foreign ideas to 
American ideals.116
Even though the Communists and the AWU were working hard within the auto industry 
to gain the trust and support of the autoworkers, the big auto manufacturers were looking for a 
way to discredit the union and the autoworkers each and every time they struck. There are 
numerous examples of AWU lead strikes in which the manufacturers discredited the workers by 
pointing out their Communist influence and leadership, beginning a long tradition of red baiting, 
which not only harmed the workers, but the image of the AWU and Communism in general.   An 
early example of this came in 1928 in Flint at the Fisher Body plant.  The federal government 
sent in B.M. Marshman, a representative, to investigate the strike, and he first contacted the 
general manager of the factory, R.J. Whiting to find out the origins of the strike.  Whiting 
informed him that the strike began in the rubber department by about 125 men.  He admitted that 
on average the workers made one dollar an hour and worked a nine hour day;  however, during 
slow times management was generous enough to curtail layoffs by cutting some of the men’s 
wages in half, while working them the same hours and still paying some of the men full salary. 
He immediately pointed the finger at Communists in the department who had their pay cut in 
half and then proceeded to get the rest of the men riled up.117
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The labor conciliator next contacted the Flint Federation of Labor (an AFL affiliate, 
which only represented skilled workers in the factory).  He reported that the Federation “refused 
to have anything to do with the matter because it was caused and conducted by a group of 
Communists.”118  His conclusion was to agree with Whiting, that no Communists should be 
rehired.  Marshman ended his investigation there, never speaking with one of the disaffected 
workers, stating “I did not attempt to get in touch with the leaders of the strike owing to what I 
had learned though Mr. Whiting and the Flint Federation of Labor.”119
For the autoworkers, this was an early lesson in the manipulation of the manufacturers 
and how they would use red baiting against the workers, denying them their rights.  The 
autoworkers, however, also learned that the only group that would help them were the 
Communists and this struggle placed them between a rock and a hard place.  The autoworkers 
continued to rely on the Communists, and the stakes got higher and higher as the depression got 
deeper and deeper.
Another example of an AWU led strike came again in Flint to the Fisher Body plants, this 
time in 1930.  The trouble began this time over more wage cuts, and 200 workers stopped 
working and walked out.  Before it was over 3,600 joined the strike and 7,500 workers were 
idled.  From the very beginning the strike was labeled as Communist inspired, which allowed for 
the Mayor and chief of police to justify the use of violence against the strikers.  Many strikers 
involved in the Sit-Down Strike of 1936 would remember how the State Police came in during 
the 1930 strike on horseback, running the strikers over and clubbing many into submission.  
Even in the midst of all of this, Marshman did not even take the time to travel to Flint.  He 
simply contacted George Starkweather, the leader of the Flint Federation of Labor, who 
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informed him it was again a Communist lead strike and that they had put the Communists 
(including Raymond) into jail that day.120
After being summarily beaten into submission by the police and understanding that they 
would most likely face permanent unemployment, many of the workers came out and publicly 
denounced the Communists and the AWU who had come in to help them.  Even Whiting 
recognized the fact that it was only because of the Communists that the workers had the nerve to 
speak up in the first place, telling the New York Times that these wage cuts had come every year 
without complaint and that “the only difference in the attitude of the men this year…is that today 
they are under the influence of communistic leaders.”121  All involved understood that the 
Communists were giving the workers a voice, and management, not liking that, used it against 
them.
Perhaps the most well-documented strike led by the AWU came in 1933 at the Briggs 
Manufacturing Plant in Detroit, which has been called the “most important labor confrontation in 
the industry during the pre-New Deal era.”122 At the time, future governor Frank Murphy was the 
Mayor of Detroit, and he established a fact-finding committee to help resolve the strike.  There 
were many complaints that came from the Briggs workers; the plant was known as one of the 
most dangerous factories in which to work.  Many of their grievances would be similar to those 
issued during the Sit-Down that was to follow in 1936.  They were striking against “dead time,” 
low wages, confusing piece rate systems that no one understood, the dreaded speed-up of the line 
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which “drove men beyond the limits of human endurance,”123 unhealthy, unclean, and dangerous 
working conditions.124
The Murphy committee looked into the employers allegations that the strike was led by 
Communist agitators and the AWU.  The committee found that the strike happened 
spontaneously among the workers, but that once out on strike they found themselves to be 
leaderless and disorganized, and so the strikers invited Raymond and the AWU to take over.  
Some of the workers claimed not to know that Raymond was a Communist, while most said that 
they knew, but also understood that they needed organization and that he was the man to do that. 
The Committee also found that the employers had exaggerated the extent of Communist 
influence and that those involved in the strike were not advertising any Communist ideals.  The 
large number of Communists involved found it necessary to conceal their identity “and whenever 
occasion requires disavow their affiliation with the Communist Party.”125  This shows 
conclusively that the autoworkers were learning that they needed the AWU and the Communists 
and that they needed to hide the fact that they were Communists for fear of being red baited.
Even though they worked to conceal their AWU affiliation, their Briggs strike was 
doomed from the beginning because the workers had taken on a much larger enemy than just the 
local Briggs’s management.  The factory made all the bodies for the Ford Motor Company, and 
Henry Ford, not happy with having to shut down his factories because of this strike, did not sit 
back and quietly wait for resolution.  He made it clear to Briggs management that it needed to 
settle the strike, or he was going to remove his dies and build his own body factory.  Briggs 
quickly offered the strikers a pay raise but would not agree to set up a union committee or 
negotiate with the workers.  The majority of the strikers held on, but in the end, Briggs simply 
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rehired through the picket lines.  After only a week the factory was back up and running.  Some 
who hired back in were strikers while others were scabs.  Those labeled as Communists were not 
rehired.126
Even though Briggs was up and running, the strike did not end, and the unrest in Detroit 
continued among those who were holding out, hoping to win union recognition.  Those workers 
on strike began to attack those who were returning to work, stoning street cars full of Briggs 
‘scabs.’  Their frustration was mounting as management told newspapers that unions were bad 
for the industry, and they would not recognize one.  Even though the Communists were blamed 
with the rise in violence that came as the strike continued, the truth was that Raymond had been 
arrested a few days before the first streetcar attack, and that the workers had come out that day 
and declared that they had “eliminated the Communists and their allied organizations in 
general.”127
The strikers at Briggs lost in the end, and they did not just lose their jobs but also an 
important battle against the manufacturers.  They showed that they could be bullied into denying 
their affiliation with the only union that was embracing them and helping them strike.  They 
showed the auto manufacturers their hand, and Briggs understood now how to defeat any 
autoworkers strike.  Walter O. Briggs told the New York Times that “the published statement of 
the strikers’ committee fully confirms what this company has said about the strike from the 
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outset, namely, that it was incited and led by Communist agitators.”128  The manufacturers gave 
the autoworkers plenty of reasons to hide any affiliation or sympathy that they had for the AWU 
or the Communist labor organizers.
The constant red baiting that occurred in the auto industry not only hurt the strike 
movement in general, but it also prevented the Communist Party and their unions from growing.  
TUUL members in general found conditions “extremely difficult” because of “blacklists, police 
raids, court injunctions, deportation of leaders, etc.”129  As a result of the red baiting and 
blacklisting techniques, most workers were greatly discouraged from officially joining 
Communist unions.  However, even Foster recognized the fact that the Communists’ “mass 
influence…extended far and wide beyond the concrete limits of the organization.”130  In 
recognizing this, the Communists in America had a policy of creating satellite organizations, 
called ‘fronts’ which reached out to the working community, gaining support without openly 
being labeled a Communist organization.  In cities such as Detroit and Flint, there was more 
support of the Communists, such as in the Detroit workers’ approval of the Diego Rivera mural 
added to the Detroit Institute of Arts in 1932.  Rivera was a well known Mexican Communist, 
yet he was commissioned for the work in Detroit.  Despite criticism when the work was unveiled 
due to its depiction of interracial workers, glorification of workers, and disrespect for religion, 
the workers of Detroit rallied behind the mural.  They held a massive protest when the city 
threatened to cover the mural, and they won, the mural still hangs in Detroit today.  Other murals 
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created by Rivera during this time, like the ones he painted for Rockefeller in New York, also 
had overt Communist themes and were covered up.131
Outside of the strike issues, the Great Depression had another disturbing effect on the 
auto industry and the drive toward industrial unionization that the Communists responded to:  
unemployment.  Throughout the nation unemployment was on the rise, but Detroit and Flint, 
along with other large manufacturing centers, were hit the hardest.  Many autoworkers were out 
of a job, and this made their focus shift from industrial unionization to survival.  The 
Communists responded to the situation.  They created unemployment councils, which were part 
of the TUUL organization.  They also organized Hunger Marches between 1930 and 1932, which 
took place in almost every major manufacturing city, including Detroit and Flint.  These marches 
and unemployment organizations were openly Communist, yet they had thousands of 
participants and followers.  In Detroit, the march turned violent once the marchers crossed the 
Detroit city line and entered Dearborn, a city run by Henry Ford and his ‘Service Department’.  
The marchers were met by clubs and bullets, and the Communist Party was the organizer of the 
victims’ funerals in Detroit, with over 60,000 reported supporters marching behind their caskets, 
which were draped in red and displayed in front of a large picture of Lenin.  The people rallied 
behind the movement, not necessarily becoming members of the CPUSA, but endorsing the 
message and identifying with the only group who was willing to lead the fight for the working 
man’s rights.132
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The Communist Party also remained militant in its support of the workers, even through 
unemployment, often times going in and reconnecting their gas or electricity once it had been 
disconnected or moving people’s goods back into their home after a landlord had evicted them. 
The Communists were able to retain labor leaders who had been fired or blacklisted because of 
their Communist affiliation by also supporting them through their unemployment. The 
Communist Party understood what few other parties even took the time to consider, which was 
that once the men went back to work, they would remember who fought for them.  The 
Communists’ work with the unemployed through the worst few years of the Depression created 
class consciousness among the workers, while giving them experience in marching and 
organizing.  All of their efforts  made the workers more open to unionism once they went back to 
work.133
The Communists found many ways to gain support among the autoworkers using 
strategies that were not employed by other political organizations.  One such policy they 
embraced was that of promoting racial equality.  They formed a bond with the African 
Americans, and this would help to bring many autoworkers into the fold.  The Communist Party 
called for class warfare, not racial warfare, and so it had no problem including them in the battle.  
The Communists worked to defend African Americans from racial injustice, such as in the 
Scottsboro case in 1931.  Nine African American men were accused of raping two white women 
on a train.  Even though the men were convicted, the CPUSA appealed the decision in 1935 and 
raised all the money for their legal defense.  It was through such maneuvers that the Communists 
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gained a reputation in the African American community, and many would remember such acts 
and help lead the unionization drive that was to come in 1936-1937.134
In 1934 the CPUSA and the Comintern entered a new phase in their battle for the 
American worker, known as the Popular Front.  This time period is marked by increased 
cooperation between the Communists and all other political movements in America, including 
the Socialists and the liberal government, all to combat fascism, which Stalin and the USSR saw 
as the true threat at the time, even over capitalism.  They were still to work to organize the 
workers and prepare them for eventual rule, but the Communists in America were freed to work 
more intimately in American society, and their decision to work well with others opened up their 
options for unionization drives as well.  Although this was the official line from the leaders of 
the CPUSA, it did not necessarily reflect any change in the Communists who were involved in 
the autoworkers’ drive.  There is much proof that they were always willing to work with any 
group that would help to organize the autoworkers even before the Popular Front, showing that 
they followed their own ‘line’ when it came to organizing the unions.  They had learned long ago 
to do whatever was necessary to achieve victory for the workers, even small victories, and they 
did not push any policies which only fought for a revolution or for the workers to overthrow the 
government.135
The Communists’ major success came in America at this time not because the country 
was ready for revolution or because capitalism was preparing to die, but because the 
Communists listened to the American people and adapted their programs to fit the needs of 
America, regardless of what the official CPUSA party line was or what the Comintern was 
instructing them to do.  America was inherently different from not only Russia, but also from 
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Europe, yet the Communists here were able to find different avenues for Marxist growth, and 
they did not stray that far from Marx or Engels.136
Engels stated that Communism would be difficult to build in America because “he saw 
clearly that the bigness, uniqueness, success, and freshness of the American Experiment had 
created a collective state of mind unusually hostile to comprehensive radicalism.”137  Difficult, 
perhaps, but not impossible.  Engels recognized that there would need to be different goals and 
tactics, and even stated that by using the government to pass labor legislation, that a democratic 
nation could work toward the goal of Communism because it was demanded and obtained by the 
workers, with their own interest in mind.  He also thought that such legislation could help to 
destroy competition inherent in capitalism and to help the workers change the system.138
Karl Marx also spoke of ways in which building Communism in a democratic nation 
could be achieved differently than in a more repressed nation.  In a speech given at The Hague in 
1872, Marx stated that “in North America barricades are unnecessary, because there, if only they 
want to, the proletariat can win victory at the polls.”139  The Communists in America proved that 
they were trying to work within the democratic system in America and not trying to overthrow it 
because of the very fact that they repeatedly participated in it.  Foster himself ran for president 
numerous times throughout the 1920s and 1930s on the Communist Party ticket, and the 
Communists in the auto industry repeatedly called for a labor party to support the specific needs 
of the workers in America. The Communists stated in 1923 that “in America, the cutting edge of 
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the revolutionary movement will have to be a political party, not because the state is important, 
but because the people think the state is important.”140
The reason that the auto workers called for their own party was because they were not 
getting results from any of the political parties that were in the running, and that included the 
New Deal Democrats of the 1930s.  The fact that the American Communists went against the 
Comintern and did not call for a violent revolution but worked to change the country in a way 
that the American workers could understand and rally behind showed that they were not blindly 
following orders from the USSR and Stalin.  In addition, the fact that they worked for a labor 
party and not only ran their own candidates, but supported Farm-Labor Candidates, instead of 
simply supporting the liberal government in place during the Popular Front showed that they had 
a mind of their own and were listening to the workers.141
Another clear sign that American Communism differed from world Communism is seen 
in the fact that many foreign members of the Communist Party had a hard time fitting into 
American Communism.  They had to let go of their old concerns and come to terms with the 
political structure of American Communism and its overall goal for trade unionism and helping 
the average worker. This was especially true in automotive cities, such as Detroit.142
Overall the American Communists were careful to listen to the workers’ needs, fight for 
better working conditions and to help the workers in ways that other political groups or unions 
were not willing to help.  The Communists were good trade unionists and organizers, and this is 
why many autoworkers were comfortable working with them and supporting them, identifying 
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the fact that the Communists main goal was helping the workers, and this was very true among 
the autoworkers during the 1920s and 1930s.  Today, the UAW itself does not hide the fact that 
its roots were planted in what it defines as the “left wing” and claim that it owes much to those 
men because to them the union always came first and “political beliefs were secondary.”143
The Socialists
The Socialist Party was seen as a less radical alternative to the Communist Party once the 
‘left wing’ had split in 1919.  There were, however, many more differences between the Socialist 
Party and the Communist Party, especially in regards to the drive to unionize the auto industry.  
By their own admission, the Socialists in America never achieved any great success, mostly 
because they were unwilling to adapt to the workers’ needs or American political ideals.  Unlike 
the Communist Party, during the 1930s the Socialists did not focus on the economic struggles of 
the workers but rather on politics and elections.  Their ultimate goal was not improving the 
situation of the worker but to rally the workers behind a socialist economy, and this proved 
difficult for them to do in America.144
The Socialist Party also suffered from a great disconnect with the autoworkers and 
marketed itself as a much more educated and elitist group.  For example, the shop papers that the 
AWU distributed under the Socialist Party’s influence were too long, expensive, and written in a 
language that most of the autoworkers could not relate to or understand.  In the eyes of most 
American workers, the only thing that the Socialists seemed to be promoting was Socialism, 
which was an idea that went against American freedoms and individualism.145
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Perhaps most damaging to the success of the Socialist Party in the auto unions during the 
1930s was its unwillingness to work with other parties in the system.  Unlike the Communists, 
who welcomed all into their cause to unionize, the Socialists worked hard to keep other groups 
out, specifically the Communists.  At one point during the trade union drive Earl Browder of the 
CPUSA wrote a letter to the Socialist Party leaders asking for the Socialists working in the auto 
industry to join a popular front with the Communists.  The request was summarily rejected.146  
The Socialist Party did not promote unity and solidarity in the auto union like the Communists 
did and was actually very vocal about its anti-Communist stand, and even its own leaders 
recognized the fact that this negativism was hurting its popularity and progress within the auto 
union movement.  “It is not the duty of revolutionary Socialists to drive the Communists out of 
the labor movement.  They cannot be driven out because they are part of it.”147
The Socialist Party, although seemingly more right wing and paletable to the American 
consciousness than Communism, was unflexible and unwilling to listen to the workers or take 
control of the unions.  Socialists spent too much time writing and promoting socialistic ideals 
and not enough time acting.  As one Socialist activist stated, “if we don’t assume the leadership, 
the Communists will…[we] talk like heroes and act like cowards.”148  The Socialists were so 
afraid of being red baited and lumped together with the Communists that they acted very little 
amongst the workers, claiming “the Socialist Party is not a Communist Party; we do not want to 
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control unions or dictate to them, nor do we want to mix into their inner affairs.”149  Thus, the 
Socialist Party was unable to obtain support among the autoworkers or labor in general.150
During the Sit-Down Strike there were Socialists involved in the movement, and they 
were so involved because they decided to work with the Communists in Flint to achieve victory.  
Some of these Socialist leaders would continue on to lead the United Auto Workers once the 
Communists were expelled at the end of the decade.  One such Socialist leader was Walter 
Reuther, and although he and his brothers Victor and Roy played important roles in the Flint 
strike of 1936, they were not the leaders or the organizers.  The Socialist Party itself identified 
that the Socialists in Flint were involved in the strike but not at a high level.  Hy Fish stated “the 
party entered auto late.  We entered during [the] strike, having no previous base in the union.”151  
After the Flint strike, the Socialist Party red baited the Communist leaders and worked to 
separate the autoworkers from the Communist Party and align the history with the Socialist 
Party.152  The Socialist labor leaders, such as Walter Reuther, would eventually even distance 
themselves from the Socialist Party as they rose to power within the UAW.  Reuther would 
continue to promote Socialism abroad but made it clear that in America he believed that 
capitalism worked best.  Much of this rhetoric was due to the pressures coming from the CIO and 
John L. Lewis, who continually called for the support of Democratic leaders such as FDR and 
not for a Farm-Labor party or Socialist candidate.153
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The Proletariats
A more regional political group that developed mostly in Michigan during the Great 
Depression was the Proletariat Party.  This was a small group but one that was also involved in 
the autoworkers movement, especially in the city of Flint.  Much like the Socialist Party, it was 
more intellectually based, establishing workers school and Proletariat Universities.  It was a quiet 
group, with numbers estimated at about one hundred members in Flint, yet many of the leaders 
were identified by Flint strikers as ones who introduced them to Communist or Socialist ideas.
The group itself split from the Michigan Socialist Party in 1918 at their convention in 
Detroit.  There was a big dispute about whether the party should support a paper entitled The 
Proletarian, which many Socialists viewed as too left wing and radical.  One side, known as the 
‘yellows’, were against it and were the less militant, while the other side, known as the ‘reds’,
were for it and were considered more radical.  At the convention, the ‘yellows’ won, but 
afterwards the ‘reds’ met in secret at midnight and decided to leave the party and form their own 
party, known as ‘The Proletarian University of America.’  All three of the Socialist Party 
representatives from Flint were members of the ‘reds’.  For a short time the Proletariats joined 
the Communists but were expelled after one month for being too right wing, or ‘mensheviks’.154
Overall, the Proletariat Party disagreed with many of the policies of the Socialists and the 
Communists and worked to educate the workers and create class consciousness.  While there is 
little information about their work among the autoworkers, from interviews conducted with those 
involved in the unionization of Flint, many of the Proletariat leaders were identified as 
supporters of the strike and as working with the Communist labor leaders to bring about victory 
for the workers.  One such leader was Lorne Herrlich, who owned Herrlich’s Pharmacy in Flint.  
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He was one of the initial three Socialists from Flint and was noted by Bob Travis as donating 
over $60,000 worth of medicine to the strikers. He was also mentioned by Simmons as a 
distributor of the Daily Worker.155
The New Deal Democrats
With the election of FDR in 1932, many autoworkers and laborers in general embraced 
the Democratic Party with hopes of change.  However, by the 1936 election the hope that many 
workers had carried to polls in 1932 had changed to disillusionment and despair as many New 
Deal programs did not deliver the change that the workers were promised, specifically in the auto 
industry.  The autoworkers felt as though they were ignored and even betrayed by FDR, the New 
Deal, and the AFL.156
One of the most touted New Deal programs was the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) which was supposed to deliver workers the right to unionize and increase their 
bargaining power.  Yet, in the end, the NIRA turned out to be an auto manufacturer’s tool and an 
ineffective force fighting for the workers.  The auto giants, such as General Motors, used the 
NIRA codes to increase the number of company unions, which were simply chosen and 
controlled by management within the plant.157
Part of the problem revolved around the fact that the NIRA codes were written by the 
largest manufacturers and were then approved by the AFL, which did not represent the rank and 
file auto workers.  The union argued that by the end of 1933 the NIRA codes had helped to 
increase GM profits by five thousand percent, all while the working conditions for their 
employees got much worse.  The regulations that the NIRA was supposed to enforce were 
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greatly ignored by the manufacturers, and they only abided by those which would benefit them.  
Most autoworkers could “cite enough industrial evasions of the NIRA to suggest that large 
numbers of laborers and unions had been deprived of those benefits which the NIRA regulatory 
system was designed to bestow. Noting instances where employers treated the law as a ‘scrap of 
paper’.”158
When the NIRA was first instated there was a huge organization drive among workers all 
over the U.S.; however, once the workers realized that their efforts were being thwarted by the 
manufacturers, there was a great swell of strikes. From 1933-1934, in the auto industry in 
particular, there was a massive strike movement in direct response to the ineffectiveness of the 
NIRA.159  Many autoworkers took to calling the NIRA the “National Run Around” because it 
was so impotent.  Most autoworkers gave up on the New Deal program and decided to take 
matters into their own hands, striking for their rights.  Any worker who was caught organizing a 
union outside of the company union was usually fired and blacklisted, regardless of the law.  
This was true at the Fisher plants in Flint, Michigan, where many men cited being fired because 
of union activity.160
Once these men were fired, the government tried to put a system into place that would 
help them to get rehired and would hold the employers accountable for their anti-union tactics, 
but this system proved in and of itself to be highly unsuccessful as well.  The National Labor 
Board, and subsequently the Auto Labor Board, were set up as an appeal process for fired 
workers.  Many times the workers appealed to the board, and the board ordered the 
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manufacturers to rehire the men, and the manufacturers summarily ignored the board.  Then what 
occurred was that the fired worker would then have to petition the board a second time, waiting 
not only for a hearing, but then weeks and months for another decision.  By this point many of 
the men had been forced to look for work in another industry or had already lost their homes.  
These men often wrote letters to FDR as a last ditch attempt to try to salvage their lives and save 
their families.161  Manufacturers like GM found ways to paralyze the boards and to forestall their 
decisions by using court injunctions issued by GM favored judges.162
Roosevelt was also damaged in the eyes of the autoworkers because of his consistent ties 
with the AFL, who had continually ignored the auto industry’s drive toward industrial 
unionization.  The AFL was opposed to striking, which seemed to be the only viable outlet for 
the autoworkers once it was clear that their bosses were not going to abide by the New Deal 
programs.163  The final nail in the coffin of the New Deal and AFL image among the 
autoworkers came in response to the great strike wave of 1933 and 1934 with the agreement they 
reached with the auto manufactures in March of 1934.  Amazingly the deal was negotiated by the 
government and the AFL without regards to the rank and file workers, and it left them all feeling 
betrayed.
The deal reached in 1934 solidified the company unions and forced the massive groups of 
autoworkers striking for better wages and working conditions, along with the right to choose 
their own union outside of the company, to give up their strikes, and go back to work.  The 
agreement also included a ‘merit clause’ which stated that in the auto industry the employers 
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could fire or promote anyone they wanted based only on their own perceived standards of merit, 
irregardless to union activity.  In so many words, they could fire anyone for any reason.  The 
agreement also stated that if outside unions were formed by the men that they should be given 
proportional representation with management.  This was the divide and conquer strategy that the 
manufacturers used against the autoworkers.  Any union could be formed, and if there were 
fifteen unions in one shop, they would have fifteen representatives sitting down with 
management.  With so many cooks in the kitchen it would be impossible for any agreement to be 
reached and the management would always win in the end.164
The AFL-FDR deal of 1934 did not end the militancy of the autoworkers, and the strikes 
around the industry continued, mostly in defiance of this agreement.  Other groups also used this 
to their advantage, like the Communists, who pointed out how the autoworkers had been 
betrayed by the government and the AFL who were interested in helping capitalist business more 
than the workers.  The economy, they argued, was on an upswing, and FDR was trying to kill the 
autoworkers strike movement because a slow down of industry would have hurt the economy.  
The autoworkers also began to feel that the AFL saw this as an opportunity to destroy the 
industrial unionization drive in auto.  This did in fact hurt the unionization of the industry, as 
autoworkers left their unions in droves.  When the UAW came into Flint in 1936, they found 
merely a shell of a union left, and the few left were mostly company spies.  None of the workers 
trusted the AFL or FDR and the New Deal.165
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One auto labor leader claimed “and there have come also the beginnings of 
disillusionment with capitalism’s savior, Roosevelt.”166  While this may seem an overly dramatic 
statement, it was indeed the feeling of the rank and file autoworker after the failed NIRA and the 
1934 deal.  When the time came for the first official UAW convention as part of the CIO in 
1935, one issue on the agenda was the decision of which candidate to endorse in the 1936 
election.  While FDR would seem to be labor’s favorite, the autoworkers voted to endorse the 
Farm-Labor Party candidate instead of FDR—a direct statement about whom they trusted and 
who they felt had their best interest at heart.  Of course, John L. Lewis had promised FDR that he 
and the New Deal would have the support of labor, and this included the autoworkers young 
union.  So, Lewis informed the delegates that they needed to take another vote, because if they 
did not endorse FDR the CIO would not be able to supply them with the $100,000 that they so 
desperately needed for their organizational drive.  The young, poor union fell into line behind 
Lewis and endorsed FDR, but its original vote stood as a testament to how it truly felt about the 
New Deal Democrats.167
Conclusion
By looking at the policies of the Communist Party in regards to the autoworkers in 
relation to those by the other major political parties and unions during the 1930s, it is clear to see 
that the rank and file autoworker would have been more apt to support a movement such as 
Communism.  The other parties and unions of the day had their own interests in mind, not the 
best interest of the workers.  Repeatedly the autoworkers were abandoned, betrayed, or ignored 
by the Socialists, the New Deal Democrats, and the AFL, while the Communist Party and their 
industrial unions supported their strikes and listened to their needs, all while pointing out the 
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inequities of the other parties.  The Communist Party also focused on the needs of the workers, 
supporting them through unemployment all while teaching them how to organize and unionize 
democratically.  
With all of this support, it may seem hard to understand why the autoworkers would not 
readily join the Communist Party or openly declare their allegiance with such an organization.  
However, because of red-baiting, fascist hate groups, and the eventual Cold War, most hid and 
then abandoned the bond that they shared with the Communist Party.  Even though, time and 
time again the autoworkers turned away from Socialism, fascism, and New Deal rhetoric, and in 
their own way endorsed American Communist ideas, once they were faced with open red-baiting 
techniques, violence prescribed by such groups as the Black Legion, and the Cold War politics 
that invaded the auto unions, many denounced and forgot their Communist beginnings.
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CHAPTER 4
THE FORCES MOUNTED AGAINST THE STRIKERS
There is no doubt the impact that the Communist Party and their sympathizers had on the 
autoworkers and the unionization of the auto industry.  Why then were there so many who 
refused to admit their alignment with the Communist movement during the Sit-Down Strike in 
Flint?  The truth is that there were many reasons for the autoworkers to be afraid of anyone 
suspecting them of working with the Communists, some that threatened their life and others their 
livelihood.  The prejudices that existed, and still exist today, in America against Communists and 
left-wing radicals created an atmosphere of hostility in the UAW before, during, and after the 
Sit-Down Strike.  
The major threat to the Communists’ safety that existed before and during the 1930s was 
the Black Legion.  The legend states the Black Legion would dress in long black robes with 
pirate hats embellished with skulls and crossbones, meeting in the middle of the night in an open 
field, reciting secret oaths and making blood pacts.168  For many auto workers during the 1930s, 
this figure was nothing they personally encountered, and most remembered the Black 
Legionnaire  as nothing more than a boogie man figure.  These figures, however, did in fact exist 
in Flint during the 1930s, and even though many Flint sit-down strikers did not admit any 
personal encounter, they knew what they stood against, and that they existed as a real threat to 
them and their drive to unionize the auto industry and General Motors. The mere existence of 
such a violent, anti-Communist group, would have instilled fear into the hearts of all union men, 
adding to the hostile atmosphere against the autoworkers one ally—the Communist Party.
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The Black Legion is somewhat of a mystery, even today.   Little has been written on the 
secretive organization.  There are many who believe that the Black Legion ideas were not short-
lived, that after Legionaires were made public, they simply merged into different organizations, 
changing their name but not their objectives.  The lack of information and the absence of 
immediate deep investigation into the group suggests that there may have been so much more to 
this organization than originally meets the eye.  Were there powerful forces behind the Black 
Legion such as politicians or auto manufacturers that worked to brush the group’s activities and 
secrets under the rug?  And why did it flourish in and around the industrial auto manufacturing 
centers but nowhere else?  Whatever the answers to these questions may be, there is no doubt 
that the Black Legion struck fear in the hearts of the auto workers in Michigan, and that their 
existence would have caused strikers to hide any affiliation they may have had with the union, 
left-wing groups, and most specifically, Communism.169
The Black Legion appeared to have been born out of the New Ku Klux Klan of the 
1920s, even though the KKK at the time strongly refuted this claim.170  The original founder is 
believed to have been Dr. William Jacob Shepard, a Grand Cyclops of the KKK in Ohio.  
Shepard supposedly wanted to spice up the Klan and find a way to attract new members.  
Somewhere between 1924 and 1925 he recruited a small band of men under his jurisdiction and 
they all dyed their Klan robes black.  The group also added a pirate like hat and skulls and 
crossbones to the ensemble, making them look even more dark and sinister.  Shepard put 
together a program of secret initiation rituals, and his group stopped participating in public Klan 
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demonstrations and parades down mainstreet.  Shepard believed that the Klan had gone too 
mainstream, that the original appeal of a secret organization was gone, and that was why the 
KKK was losing members.  By making everything dark and secretive, he believed more men 
would be drawn into the organization, and he was right.171
Shepard’s group came to be known as the Black Guard but was still part of the active 
KKK.  In 1925 the Black Guard appeared at a Konclave gathering and were given the job of 
guarding the barrels used to collect member dues.  The other Klan members in attendance were 
intrigued by the secretive new group, and Shepard later claimed that he had so many interested in 
forming their own Black Guards that the leaders of the Klan became jealous of his popularity, 
prompting them to boot the Black Guards from the KKK.  The Black Guards then became 
known as Black Knight Riders and finally, towards 1930-1931, they were the Black Legion.172
The Black Legion under Shepard was quite different from the Black Legion which would 
emerge in the 1930s under new leadership; however, all of their rituals and traditions would stay 
the same.  Shepard’s Black Legion was based on the same beliefs and targeted the same enemies 
as the New KKK of the 1920s:  African Americans, Jews, Catholics, Communists, and 
immigrants.  As the Legion switched leaders in 1932 to a man named Virgil H. Effinger (known 
as Bert) from Lima, Ohio, the group took on a much more militant Americanist attitude.  
Effinger was also a former KKK member, but the group was now moving farther away from 
their KKK roots, focusing more on immigrant and radical infiltration of the industrial 
manufacturing centers, such as Lima, Ohio.  Effinger kept the vision of Shepard as a ‘father-
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figure’ to the group, and they continued to focus on private rituals, especially night riding and 
terrorism.173
The Black Legion had always had a militaristic structure, yet Effinger took this structure 
to a new extreme when he assumed control.  The men were divided into companies of ninety-
nine men; then there were four companies to a battalion and four battalions to a regiment.  Each 
man was also given a rank (foot legion, night riders, black knights, armed guards, bullet club).  
There were also elite units, many of which carried out the most horrible crimes of murder 
committed by the Black Legion.  The Legion also worked hard in the beginning to recruit men 
who were ‘violent’ in nature, such as military men (particularly National Guardsmen), police 
officers, prison guards, etc.  174
The Black Legion under Effinger began to spread outside of Ohio, especially north into 
Michigan, where there were an abundance of industrial workers merging with Southern  white 
immigrants and foreign immigrants as well.  The existence of Southern white workers in Detroit 
and Flint gave the Black Legion a base to start from, seeing as many of these men were already 
open to KKK beliefs and may have even been members of the KKK already.  At the time
Michigan had the largest acknowledged KKK membership of any state, with 875,000 members.   
Making the leap from the KKK to the Black Legion was simple, and having their jobs threatened 
by incoming foreign immigrants also provided fertile ground for hatred.175  
The exact date that the Black Legion spread into Michigan is not known, but most 
accounts place its migration somewhere in the middle of 1933.  Isaac (Peg-Leg) White was a 
former Detroit Police Officer who had met Effinger at a conference in Ohio in 1931; they both 
decided that Detroit was prime for a group such as the Black Legion to flourish.  White was the 
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perfect person to work for Effinger and recruit new members.  He had lost a leg while involved 
in an auto accident while on duty as a policeman.  Therefore, he no longer needed to work and he 
received a healthy pension of $104 a month from the city of Detroit.  He was free to focus all his 
time and attention on the Legion and its activities.  As part of the city of Detroit he had grown to 
dislike the union organizers, whom he saw as radicals that were coming in and threatening 
American freedom.  He worked with Henry Ford’s notorious ‘service department’176 as a part of 
their citizen’s committee, which was responsible for collecting the names of Communists in the 
factories and turning them over to management.  White was quite proud of this work and stated 
to the newspaper that he “called on all the plants of Detroit.  Once or twice I turned in a bunch of 
names to the Hudson Motor Car Company.  How many I don’t remember but there were 
several.”177
White used the Black Legion’s KKK roots to recruit new men in Detroit in the beginning, 
convincing many of them that this was a KKK affiliated group.  Once they were in, they were 
then set about the task of recruiting their own members.  The Legion had many different ways in 
which they acquired new members.  One was by simply playing off their fear and hatred of 
Communist infiltration of  America, aiming their hatred mostly at immigrants coming in to steal 
their jobs during the Depression.  One Black Legion recruiter in Detroit, Arthur Lupp, stated 
“you must remember that during the depression there was this condition:  many men were 
depressed.  They had no purpose in life.  They were floundering around.  This organization gave 
them an interest in life.”178  There is no doubt that the Legion gave the men not only an interest 
in life, but an object of their anger and a face to blame for their plight in life.  A few of the 
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known Black Legion former members later claimed that they joined because there was nothing 
wrong with the idea of hating Communists, and that they were also drawn to the rituals, secret 
meetings, and mystique of it all.179
Another recruiting tactic used by the Black Legion in Michigan was that they created a 
network in which the organization controlled employment in the community.  The Black Legion 
would first recruit politicians and local leaders to join by promising them the votes of the 
organization (which had grown quite quickly in many communities, such as Pontiac).  Once they 
had the politicians, they would have local jobs, especially those controlled by New Deal 
organizations or local boards, only reserved for Black Legion members.  This employment ring 
was vital to the Black Legion’s survival during the Great Depression, when many men would do 
whatever it took to have a job.  They also strong-armed and threatened business management to 
hire Black Legion members and fire union organizers and suspected Communists.180
The Black Legion was known as the common man’s organization, which helped to 
separate it from the KKK which had fallen from grace by the 1930s due to internal corruption.  
The Black Legion only charged a ten cent a month optional due, and the leaders of the group, 
such as Shepard and Effinger, never lived lavish lifestyles or profited from the group.  The Black 
Legion also had a lot of front organizations which were well respected throughout the 
community, allowing its members to also claim membership to these important social clubs.  
One such club, The Wolverine Republican Club, claimed as its members all the men who would 
later be tried for murder in Detroit as part of the Black Legion.181
                                                
179 Clinansmith, 252;  “86 in Oakland Named by Grand Jury as Black Legion Members,” The Detroit News, 
9-1-36, 14, Wyndham Mortimer Collection, Acc. No. 1171, Box 2, Folder 9:  Black Legion Clippings, Walter Reuther 
Labor Archives at Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.
180 Clinansmith, 248, 251;  Lissner;  George Morris, The Black Legion Rides (New York:  Workers Library 
Publishers, 1936), 9.
181 Amann, 499;  Morris, 7;  Clinansmith, 254.
89
Probably the most successful form of recruitment for the Black Legion was also the most 
underhanded and sinister:  forced enrollment.  Many Black Legion members told of how they 
were tricked into joining the secret organization.  Some men went to the initiation ceremony 
willingly, believing that it was a harmless group aimed at preserving American freedoms, while 
others were lured to a poker game or a hunting expedition, only to find themselves on their knees 
in the middle of nowhere, surrounded by men in black robes with a pistol to their head.  There 
are many accounts of the initiation ceremony, and all of them tell the same story.  The new 
initiates were blind-folded, so as to not know their location.  They were often times led into the 
middle of the woods late at night, or to a member’s dark basement.  Once there the blind fold 
was removed, yet all they could see were men around them dressed from head to toe in black, 
their identities concealed.  Next they were directed to kneel down in the center of the group, at 
which time the leader would come up behind them and place a pistol on the back of their head, 
while another member poked one in their ribs, pointed at their heart.  The new recruit was then 
forced at gunpoint to recite the oath, part of which stated “In the name of God and the Devil, one 
to reward and the other to punish, I pledge that I will exert every possible means in my power to 
the extermination of the anarchist, Communist, the Roman hierarchy and the arbiters.”182
The forcible initiation of Black Legion members added to its solidarity and intrigue.  
Many of the men found themselves out in the middle of the woods, surrounded by armed, 
hooded strangers, and forced to pledge allegiance to the group.  Once in the Black Legion many 
found it difficult to get out, even if they wanted to or they had not been successfully 
indoctrinated in the organization’s beliefs.  Once in the group they were forced to purchase a 
firearm (many of which were sold to them by the Black Legion leaders).  They were also given a 
bullet on initiation night that they were to carry with them at all times, not just as a means of 
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identifying fellow Black Legion members, but also as a reminder.  They were told when 
receiving that bullet that the leader of the group had an identical matching bullet which would be 
used to kill them if they divulged the group’s secrets, refused an order, or stepped out of line in 
any way.  After such a frightful initiation ceremony the new initiate would certainly not question 
the group’s seriousness or ability to conduct violence.    New initiates also had to memorize all 
the different codes and gestures for the group, since speaking openly about ones membership 
was forbidden.183
Even though the Black Legion claimed a long list of enemies, much like the KKK, the 
Black Legion in Michigan seemed to specifically target suspected Communists who had direct 
ties to the union and labor organization.  While Michigan State Police records indicate that there 
may have been as many as fifty murders in the Detroit and Flint areas linked to the Black 
Legion, most of these went unpunished.  There were two major murders in the Detroit area that 
were directly linked to the Black Legion, that of George Marchuk and John Bielak.  Marchuk 
was the Secretary-Treasurer of the Auto Workers Union (a well known Communist union) and 
he was found murdered in Lincoln Park, a suburb of Detroit, in December of 1933.  The AWU 
went before the city council and made a plea for an investigation into the murder, stating that 
they knew the secret anti-labor organization was behind it.  Their requests were ignored and  
only in 1936 was there a direct link made between the murder of Marchuk, Isaac White, and the 
Black Legion.184
John Bielak was a member of the AFL (through the new UAW) and he was found beaten 
to death in Monroe, Michigan in March of 1934.  Bielak was found with union applications 
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under his head, meaning his was probably murdered while trying to recruit union members.  
Isaac White was later identified in Bielak’s murder as well by a witness from Ford who stated 
that White had come to him and identified Bielak as a Communist.  Many union organizers 
began to fear for their lives after the murder of Bielak, “convinced that the slain man was the 
victim of the terrorists.”185
Many of the crimes associated with the Black Legion were not murders, simply acts of 
violence and destruction against union organizers, such as intimidation of strikers’ families 
during strikes.  Sometimes Black Legionaires beat auto workers involved in unionization or 
threw sticks of dynamite at their cars. Others saw their farms and homes burnt to the ground in 
the middle of the night.  Many times the victims of Black Legion destruction would find that the 
police were not interested in investigating the crime.  When one man’s barn was burnt to the 
ground the police did not comb the area for suspects but dug through the rubble looking for 
Communist literature.186
The terrorist group targeted many labor unions through spy infiltration.  Black Legion 
members were sent into the unions to spy and bring them down, either by causing internal 
friction and corruption, or by identifying the members and releasing the information to 
management.  Frank X. Martell of the Detroit Federation of Labor said “we have wondered what 
has caused the friction in the labor movement of the state in past few years.  I have sensed these 
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things when unions would withdraw suddenly…undoubtedly the Black Legion has been in the 
back of these things.”187
The Black Legion’s most notorious murder in Michigan was that of Charles Poole, which 
brought the organization to national attention in 1936.  Poole was not a Communist nor a union 
organizer.  He was someone that a Black Legion member had a particular grudge against because 
he was a Catholic and had married a member’s sister.  The group made up a story that Poole had 
been beating his pregnant wife, which initiated their original violence against him; however, that 
claim was later proven false.  The Poole murder brought sixteen Black Legion members to 
justice in Detroit along with national condemnation for the organization.  Many political leaders 
were found to have ties to the Black Legion (specifically in Oakland County, right outside of 
Detroit).  Some historians argue that this public trial signaled the end of the Black Legion late in 
1936 (before the Sit-Down Strike); however, there is much evidence to suggest that the real 
leaders of the Black Legion, and most of its members remained strong after the Poole trial, going 
even further underground and then changing the name of their organization.188
The survival of the Black Legion’s leaders and members after their public ousting in 
1936 is a very important issue when trying to gauge their effect on the Flint autoworkers 
involved in the 1936-1937 Sit-Down Strike.  Was the terrorist organization destroyed by the 
Poole trial and investigation or were they still around to threaten union leaders and Communist 
sympathizers?  There are many indications that the Legion did survive past 1936, morphing into 
other organizations, most prominently one called the Patriot League of America, which was 
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begun by the Black Legion’s own leader Effinger.  This new organization was a little different 
from the Black Legion:  it allowed Catholics (like Poole had been) to join, and their primary 
target became Communists.  The Patriotic League continued to target Michigan for members,
charging five dollars nationally to join but only three dollars in Michigan.  Effinger also openly 
admitted that most of the Patriotic League’s members were former Black Legion members.189
The Legion’s activities continued and their hatred of  labor organizers and Communists 
remained because the situation in Michigan was not changing in their favor in 1936, it was just 
the opposite.  The UAW and the CIO had moved in around the labor industry and were gaining 
momentum in their union drive.  This would be the time for anti-labor organizations to increase 
their activity, not diminish.  Labor unions and their supporters believed that the Black Legion’s 
following actually continued to grow throughout the Poole trial and investigation, as none of the 
leaders of the terrorist group were brought to justice or identified.  Forrest Davis of the New 
Republic wrote during the Poole trial “let no one make the mistake of believing that the 
incarceration of Dean and Davis, the displacing and reprimand of minor office-holders and the 
public scorn heaped upon the Black Legion will expunge from this community the backward 
sentiments dramatized by the Legion.”190
The Legionnaires themselves even came out publically to announce that they were not 
going away just because of the Poole investigation.  A section of the group in Detroit sent a letter 
to a labor organization in June of 1936, right in the midst of the Poole investigation, and stated, 
“Whereas some seditious persons have seen fit to call a meeting to protest the Patriotic Acts of 
the so-called Black Legion, be it known that a state of Civil War exists in this city, county and 
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state, which will continue to exist till the alien and subversive elements are exterminated or until 
the last patriot is dead.  P.S.  The Black Legion is only the little finger of the fist raised against 
you.”191  It is simple to understand why many labor organizers and Communist sympathizers in 
Michigan did not see the Poole investigation as the end of the Black Legion but as a raise in the 
stakes and heightened sense of hostility between the two sides.
The Black Legion’s activities were not simply centered around Detroit, although most of 
the information documenting the Black Legion comes from that area because of its larger 
population.  The Black Legion (and its affiliates and surviving organizations) also flourished in 
Flint, Michigan.  Some estimate that their membership in Flint was well over two thousand, yet 
because of the lack of membership records, exact numbers are hard to pin-point.  There is no 
question, however, that the Black Legion was alive and well in Flint during 1936, as six men 
were also brought to trial there due to Black Legion exposure in Detroit surrounding the Poole 
investigation.  Two of these men, Carl Moore and Teutenberg, admitted to being members of the 
Black Legion and also stated that Effinger had been to Flint and attended meetings.  Teutenberg 
also confirmed that the initiation ceremony described by those in Detroit was the same in Flint, 
and that he had promised to not only participate in night-rides but also any call to violence.192
The Black Legion leaders continued to speak out in the Flint area, even during the 
investigations and trials, signaling that the Black Legion was not disappearing in Flint either.  A 
Newspaper clipping from the Flint area during the trials stated that even though the Black Legion 
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was “believed to have been keeping quietly in the background” they had “come to life in Flint 
and Genesee County.  Almost on the eve of trials for six Flint men accused of perjury in 
connection with the recent one-man grand jury investigation, a defiant ‘Declaration of Principles 
of the Black Legion has been mailed to circuit judges.”193  This ‘Declaration’ was mailed from a 
small suburb of Flint named Durand.  The article then continued to list the sixteen principles of 
the Black Legion, leaving a few to the imagination by simply stating they were “unprintable”.
The exact strength of the Black Legion in Flint, apparent as it may seem, was less 
important than its perceived strength to the union leaders and autoworkers involved in the Sit-
Down Strike.  Many of them believed that the Black Legion was alive and well in Flint during 
the organizational drive in the fall of 1936 and the strike itself, causing many to fear reprisal for 
their union activities and left-wing affiliations.  Wyndham Mortimer, the UAW organizer first 
sent to Flint in June of 1936 to begin the organizational drive, and a well-known Communist, 
believed very strongly that the Black Legion was after him and other autoworkers.  He claimed 
that the Black Legion was the first to greet him in Flint, that when he arrived at the Dresden hotel 
he received a phone call and was told to “get the hell back where you came from if you don’t 
want to be carried out in a wooden box.”194  Mortimer claimed that he had no doubt that this 
threat came directly from the Black Legion.
Robert Travis, the second UAW organizer sent into Flint to replace Mortimer during the 
fall of 1936, also had a strong belief that the Black Legion not only existed in Flint but was 
running the city, and that they also targeted him and his fellow labor organizers.  During the Sit-
Down Strike, Travis claimed to have received a phone call from a distraught man at two in the 
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morning, claiming that he had been given a gun by the police and told to go and kill Travis.  The 
man claimed he did not want to do this, and so he was informing Travis of this threat.  Travis 
called his fellow organizer Charlie Killinger to come and hear the man’s story as well (Killinger 
confirmed Travis’s account).  Travis and Killinger then called Governor Murphy to let him know 
of the threat, which was then relayed to the National Guard in Flint who confronted the Chief of 
Police and tried to avert any further violence.  Travis and Killinger both believed the origin of 
the threat was the Black Legion.195
The union leaders and the autoworkers in Flint thought that the plants themselves were 
infiltrated by the Black Legion and that the auto manufacturers were very much behind the 
strength and growth of the organization.  It was no secret that Flint was a General Motors town, 
meaning that the auto giant controlled every aspect of the community, making it the perfect place 
for the Black Legion to flourish.  Mortimer stated that Fisher Body Plant #1 had close to three 
thousand employees who were also members of the Black Legion.  Other strikers involved in the 
Sit-Down Strike also name certain strikers and members of the union as being Black Legion 
members and spies (such as Bert Harris).  This belief that not only were the city officials, police 
officers and managers members of the terrorist group, but that their fellow co-workers and 
strikers were members certainly created an atmosphere of fear among the union members and 
Communist sympathizers.196
The primary question still surrounding the Black Legion is who was really behind its 
formation, growth, and spread around Michigan?  Union organizers such as Mortimer and 
Travis, along with their supporters, had no doubt that the auto barons were behind the Black 
Legion.  For evidence, they point first of all to the lack of investigation into the Black Legion’s 
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illegal activities until 1936 and the death of Poole.  Countless murders, arsons, and beatings went 
down as unsolved simply because the targets were Communists or labor organizers.  Until Poole, 
who was not part of a labor organization, was killed, there was little to no public record of the 
organization or its activities.  Even with the Poole murder only the sixteen men initially tied to
the crime were ever brought to trial, while the leaders of the organization remained unknown and 
free to continue their activities.  Union supporters believed wholeheartedly that the Black Legion 
trials for the Poole murder were used as a way to “whitewash” the organization and protect the 
“states industrial barons.”197
Indeed the trials in Detroit and Flint seemed to be a way to quickly deal with the 
immediate perpetrators and lead the nation to believe that justice had been served and the Black 
Legion had been destroyed.  Looking into the trials themselves it becomes easy to understand 
where the labor leaders’ fears of cover-up came from.  First, in Detroit, the Poole trial 
investigation was led by a one-man Grand Jury, overseen by Judge  Chenot, who had distinct ties 
to Henry Ford.  Judge Chenot was the county prosecutor in Detroit during the Ford Hunger 
March in 1932, and he never charged anyone with the murder of the six unemployed 
(Communist affiliated) marchers.  Chenot was the only one to hear the testimony of the Black 
Legion members during the Poole investigation, and he made sure that the names of the Black 
Legion members given during the Grand Jury trial were sealed, protecting those identified by the 
sixteen men eventually brought to trial.198  In Flint, six Black Legion members were also brought 
up on charges, and their case was also assigned to a one-man Grand Jury under Judge Black, 
who would be found during the Flint Sit-Down Strikes to be the owner of a large sum of GM 
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stock.  Judge Black also would not disclose the identities of the Black Legion members named 
during the Grand Jury or any of their crimes in and around Flint.199
To the autoworker in 1936 it certainly made sense that the Black Legion was being 
sponsored by their own employers, and union members and Communists such as Bud Simons 
told stories forty years later about how he had personally seen Black Legion uniforms being 
made and produced in the GM factories in Flint during the night.  Henry Kraus also claimed that 
Nellie Thomas, a floor lady in one of the GM shops, was the one who was making all of the 
Black Legion robes.  The one group of men that benefitted the most from the destruction of the 
UAW and autoworkers would have been the auto barons, and they had the power, money, and 
prestige in the Michigan industrial communities to not only recruit men but to also cover up the 
illegal activities and protect their own identities.  Perhaps some of this belief could be excused as 
frightened autoworkers constructing a conspiracy theory against their number one enemy, yet 
others also saw a tie between the two.  The Governor of Pennsylvania, George H. Earle, attended 
a meeting in Detroit about the Black Legion during the Poole trial and stated that “the 
responsibility for this shameless, un-American, barbaric organization rests directly upon the 
doorsteps of those powerful financial industrial interests” and he specifically named the DuPonts 
as Black Legion sponsors.200
Whether the Black Legion was directly controlled and sponsored by the auto barons is 
less important than the fact that the autoworkers, labor organizers, and Communist sympathizers 
believed and feared that it was.  The fear that existed surrounding the Black Legion was very real 
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in Flint before, during, and after the Sit-Down Strike.  This fear alone, whether founded or not, 
would be enough to cause many UAW and Communist supporters to hide their affiliation not 
only during the strike but for years to come.
There was another very real threat to the Communists among the autoworkers which 
came to light very quickly after the Sit-Down Strike, and that was prejudice within their own 
union.  A  great purge of left-wing elements began in March of 1937.  Many who had been on 
the forefront of the battle against General Motors soon found themselves on the fringes of the 
UAW as a significant battle began over the leadership of the union, and it was the Communists 
who were being threatened with expulsion.  Much like Communist Phil Raymond had suspected 
in the 1920s during the organizational drive of the AWU when he likened the AWU and 
Communists to the fire department, once the emergency was over, the Communists were 
dismissed because they were no longer needed.  Being a Communist in the UAW in the days and 
years following the Sit-Down strike would get you kicked out of the union regardless of what 
role you had played in the victory.  This kind of ideological cleansing made  being a Communist 
or even left wing a dangerous thing to admit.  As one strike participant put it “once you were 
exposed as a Communist, you were voted out of any office that you held.”201
The main force behind the expulsion of the Communists from the UAW was the UAW
president during the Sit-Down Strike, Homer Martin.  Even during the strike he showed that he 
had reservations about the Communists in the union, particularly Wyndham Mortimer who was 
first sent to organize Flint in the summer of 1936.  By the fall, Martin worked to have Mortimer 
removed, claiming that he was too left wing, claiming Mortimer was “building a Red empire in 
Flint.”202  Eventually Mortimer agreed to leave Flint but only if the UAW sent in Robert Travis 
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as his replacement.  At the time Travis was a very young, inexperienced organizer, and although 
he was also known to be left-wing, the UAW agreed to send him into Flint, believing that he 
would be much easier to control that Mortimer, who was already quite powerful in the union.
Once Travis had success in organizing Flint and the strike was underway, Martin and the 
UAW held their tongues against the Communists involved and worked together towards an 
ultimate victory.  Yet, immediately following the strike in Flint Martin insisted on ridding the 
union of Communists. Martin was getting his fuel from higher up in the CIO, where there was 
also a great deal of animosity toward the Communists either from the Socialists or those who 
were afraid of the entire labor movement being red baited for its Communist affiliation. 203  
Martin first attacked the Communist leaders in Michigan in March of 1937 during the 
Chrysler strike in Detroit where the workers were fighting for the same deal that the workers in 
Flint had received.  After two weeks of a Sit-Down Strike at Chrysler, Martin made a deal with 
management to evacuate the factories and begin negotiations as long as Chrysler did not resume 
operations during that time.  The UAW did secure the workers in Detroit the same deal as those 
in Flint.  Many workers, however, still wanted exclusive collective bargaining rights written into 
the agreement and Martin blamed the Communists for insisting on those rights, stating that they 
were inciting the workers to rebel against the deal that the UAW had made in order to cause 
problems within the union.204
There were other problems following the UAW immediately after the Sit-Down Strike.  
Mainly, there were many spontaneous sit-down strikes all over the state of Michigan, known as 
wild-cat strikes.  Martin also blamed these wild-cat strikes on the Communists, insisting that they 
were trying to take control of the union through such actions that were not sanctioned by the 
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leaders of the UAW such as himself.  The picture painted of the Communists by Martin was 
quite unfair, and many of the strikers in Flint would later agree.  The wild-cat strikes were not 
led by any one group but were great exhales of power after the struggle between the rank and 
file workers and management.  After such a long power struggle it was only natural that there 
would be an adjustment period immediately following the UAW’s victory.  Most wild-cat strikes 
were a result of the men testing their agreement with GM and their new found power inside the 
factory.205
Tales still survive that the Communist party was in fact trying to take complete control of 
the UAW in the days that followed the strike, and that their quest for power was what caused the 
factionalism in the UAW and the eventual split between 1937 and 1939.  Yet, in fact, Martin 
caused the fractionalization by trying to solidify his own power by getting rid of the 
Communists.  In the beginning of the struggle until 1938, the Communist Party did not buck 
back against Martin’s accusations, claiming that they wanted to work towards unity in the UAW 
and hold the union together, while Martin launched attack after attack.  During that time the 
leaders of the Flint movement saw themselves pushed farther and farther to the outside of the 
UAW.  Henry Kraus was demoted from editor of the union paper to assistant editor and then 
fired completely in 1937.  Mortimer and Victor Reuther were removed from important 
organizing drives within the auto industry and Robert Travis was demoted and eventually 
removed from Flint.206
There were those who were disturbed by the dismissal of the Flint leaders, especially 
Travis.  Reporter Joe Brown, who made it clear that he himself disliked Communists, stated that 
“the dismissal of the fighting, militant leaders who led the fight against General Motors showed 
                                                
205 Keeran, The Communist Party, 189;  Travis, interview;  Kraus, interview.
206 Keeran, The Communist Party, 190, 191; Travis, interview; Kraus, interview;  Anthony, 33.
102
that Martin and his crowd were ruthless.”207  At the 1937 UAW convention there were clearly 
two sides forming over this debate.  Martin called his side the Progressive Caucus, while the 
group on the other side, led by Mortimer and Walter Reuther, called themselves the Unity 
Caucus.  The majority of the workers at the convention went with the Unity Caucus.  Martin was, 
however, allowed to stay in power and he even controlled most of the Executive Committee.  
The Unity Caucus placed Mortimer and Ed Hall as Vice Presidents.  Yet, Martin got the board to 
extend the office and allow five Vice Presidents, to which he appointed three of his own men.  
Under this new board Martin passed many resolutions which would help him defeat the 
Communists.  He was allowed a budget to pay for spies to provide him with secret intelligence 
against the Communists, he was also given the power to suspend UAW members without a trial 
and he abolished the local union papers, which were very often the voice of the Communists and 
the rank and file workers.208
After this solidification of Martin’s power within the UAW in 1937, he went after the 
Communists and specifically Travis.  He accused Travis and Mortimer of using strike funds 
during the Sit-Down Strike to fund the Communist Party instead of the workers.  Travis happily 
opened the financial records from the strike and proved to the UAW that there was no 
misappropriation of funds, but the accusation, already out there, stuck in many people’s minds.  
In reality there were workers and union members in Flint who were on Martin’s side, that were 
eager to get rid of a lot of the leaders of the Sit-Down Strike; but as many of the strikers claimed, 
this was not because they believed Martin or hated the Communists, but because they also 
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wanted control on the local level, and red baiting was the most effective way to achieve that 
goal.209
There was a division that existed on the local level in Flint following the strike that 
played into this fractionalization by Martin and made his quest against the Communists much 
more successful.  It is no secret that those who were involved in the Sit-Down Strike were the 
more radical of the rank and file men because they were not afraid to seek the change that they 
desired.  However, after the strike there was a great swell of excitement for the UAW among the 
workers who had seemed so much against the strike while it was underway.  These men flooded 
to the union once victory was achieved, and not only did the ones who had fought so hard against 
GM have animosity toward the new comers, but also the men who were not involved in the strike 
were very eager to remove the leaders from power and take control of the union themselves.  
Martin used the friction already present to oust Travis from his position.  Travis knew it!  At a 
dinner held in his honor in Flint before he left town he declared emphatically, “today we have in 
the high places in the Flint Local, men who were on the sidelines during the big battle last 
winter.”210
Martin did begin to overstep his boundaries, however, and the opposition against him 
grew among the rank and file workers all throughout the UAW.  By 1938 Martin was being 
confronted by the workers and he was buckling, punching one in the face and pulling a gun on 
another.  Next, Martin suspended five members of the Executive Board for Communist activities.  
Maurice Sugar defended the five suspended board members by showing that Martin had written 
letters plotting how to get rid of Kraus, Travis, and other leaders in Flint to solidify his own 
power.  The letters were an embarrassment for Martin, but because the five members of the 
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Board who opposed him were suspended and could not vote in their own favor, the Board did 
convict the five members, which included Mortimer.  They were expelled from the union.  Since 
there was so much dissent that followed, John L. Lewis, the leader of the CIO, stepped in and 
forced Martin to reinstate the five men.  The Executive Board then forced Martin from the union.  
Martin, of course, blamed Lewis and the CIO for getting involved in the UAW’s affairs.211
Next, Martin tried to take the UAW out of the CIO and back to the AFL, which also 
angered a lot of UAW men who remembered how poorly they were treated by the AFL in 1934.  
The combination of Martin’s tyrannical actions, the men’s hatred for the AFL, and the dismissal 
of top organizers who were affiliated with the Communist Party brought the majority of the 
UAW men to back the Unity Caucus and the CIO.212  It also helped that the Unity Caucus 
contained the leaders of the Sit-Down strike, along with dynamic new leaders like Walter 
Reuther.  At the 1939 UAW convention many felt that Mortimer had a good chance to win the 
presidency.  There were calls, however, for someone who would be more neutral, not as openly 
Communist as Mortimer.  These calls mainly came from Walter Reuther and the Socialists 
within the Unity Caucus.  In an effort to hold the union together, the Communists and Mortimer 
agreed and R.J. Thomas was elected president of the UAW.  It seemed that the problems for the 
Communists were not over simply because Martin and his faction were out of the UAW.  They 
now faced open opposition from the Socialists and men like Walter Reuther.  Immediately after 
Thomas took the presidency the Executive Board was cleansed of all Communist influence.  
Reuther went on a crusade to rid the UAW of the Communists who had not only won the strike 
in Flint but had also helped him get rid of Martin.  Travis claimed that Reuther got him fired 
from his tool and die job the day before he got seniority, which prompted Travis to leave the 
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UAW and the auto industry completely.  Reuther began red-baiting the Communists and rose to 
power by waging his crusade against the left because “Stalin is trying to take over control of the 
union.”213
Walter Reuther would go on not only to purge Communists from the UAW, but he also 
left the Socialist Party around 1939, all in attempts to move up in the UAW, and at that he was 
quite successful.  The problems that the Communists had in the union went deeper than just 
prejudice and hatred for their beliefs but was rooted in fear.  Men like Martin and Reuther 
identified the importance of the Communist members in the UAW and also the support that they 
had gained from the rank and file workers after the Sit-Down Strike.  Both men knew that in 
order to win control of the UAW they would have to get rid of the Communists, and the only 
way to do that was to paint them in a negative light under the shadow of the growing power of 
the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin and because of the naitivity of the American people.  No 
matter what the motives were behind the expulsion, it was a very real and tragic event that 
occurred in the UAW’s history, and it was something that surely caused fear among the 
Communists who now had to fight the union itself to keep their jobs and the rights they had 
fought so hard to earn during the Sit-Down Strike.  There were many strikers who were 
interviewed who declined to speak about Communists who were extremely hesitant to even 
name someone that they might have suspected of being a Communist, all because they 
recognized that there would and could be backlash against that person from their own union.  As 
Norman Bully admitted in 1980, forty-three years after the strike, “I hate to identify guys as 
Communists now, because I wouldn’t want to hurt them or their families.”214
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Whether men were afraid of the boogie man or their own local UAW leader, there was a 
real and tangible fear among the rank and file men involved in the Flint Sit-Down Strike who 
associated themselves with the Communist Party.  That fear alone has changed the collective 
memory of the strike and the political affiliation of many of those who were involved.  That must 
be taken into account when considering the extent of influence the Communist Party had among 
the workers in Flint during the 1930s and beyond.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The workers involved in the Flint Sit-Down strike left behind a legacy that lives on in 
Flint, the UAW, and throughout the history of labor organization.  Their own story, however, has 
never been told.  Who they were, how they truly felt inside the factories for forty-four days, who 
they trusted, or who they were afraid of—all have been left out of the story of the strike.  By 
investigating the strikers’ collected memories, along with primary source material from the 
actual strike, it is possible partially to answer such questions.  It is also possible to address the 
issue of the strikers’ political affiliation in a way that has been ignored because of the politically 
charged attitudes toward leftists and specifically Communists in America.
So many see the association of the Sit-Down strikers with the Communist Party as a 
negative affiliation, one that must be used as slanderous against the memory of the strike and the 
rank and file workers.  This study, however, was an attempt to reconcile that truth and that 
tradition, putting the Communist and left wing elements of the UAW into the context of the day.  
By recognizing that the Communists in America were the only ones who were listening to the 
disaffected autoworkers and supporting them in their struggles toward industrial unionization, 
one can begin to understand the true political leanings of the autoworkers.  Instead of viewing 
their Communist ties as something to be ashamed of, one can identify with their motives and 
have a better understanding of the difficulties that the strikers faced.
Over the years it has become very easy for historians to ignore or deny the Communist 
leanings of the rank and file autoworker during the Sit-Down strike because so many of the men 
later denied any such affiliation or refused to discuss it.  By looking not only at the hostile 
atmosphere towards the Communists before and during the strike, but also how that intensified in 
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America as it entered the Cold War, one can see that the strikers had very good reason to avoid 
any association with the Communists.  The picture of Communism that entered the American 
consciousness after the Bolshevik Revolution was certainly different from the Communists who
were operating in the industrial trade unionization drive, specifically among the autoworkers.  In 
truth, the Communists in America who worked in the Sit-Down strike were fighting for the same 
things that the workers all believed in—a living wage, seniority benefits, better working 
conditions, and union democracy.  The autoworkers followed the Communists not because they 
were fighting to overthrow the American government but because they wanted to improve their 
lives, and the Communists were providing them with the organization and leadership to do just 
that.
The fact that the American people could not reconcile their prejudice and fear against 
men like Lenin and Stalin and what was happening within the USSR certainly tainted their view 
of the American Communists working within the trade unionization effort and the autoworkers.  
This prejudice only intensified as America emerged from World War II and eventually entered 
the Cold War.  The immediate hatred toward the Communists in the unionization drive 
manifested itself in the creation of violent groups, such as the Black Legion, that targeted the left 
wing elements of the union.  After the strike, this hatred continued and became even more 
obvious as it manifested itself in the UAW through the Communist purges.  This prejudice and 
hatred was still alive and well when most of the strikers were interviewed for the Labor History 
Project (the 1970s and 1980s) while America was still in the thick of the Cold War.  Those 
interviewed still had reservations about disclosing their political affiliation because they 
understood the threat that had existed against them.
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The Flint Sit-Down strike was a success because of the autoworkers’ affiliation with the 
Communist Party.  The strike leaders themselves, Wyndham Mortimer and Robert Travis, were 
part of the Communist movement in America at the time, and they brought with them the 
organizational experience and the ability to gain the trust of the autoworkers in Flint.  Many of 
those who helped to fund the strike and support the strikers during those forty-four days were 
also part of the Communist movement, including the cook who came up from Detroit, Max 
Gazan, along with Henry and Dorothy Kraus who ran the strike paper and organized the women 
to provide food for the men.  The Communist involvement went all the way up to the UAW 
lawyers, Maurice Sugar and Lee Pressman, in Detroit, who worked to get the first injunction 
thrown out, while also participating in all of the negotiations with GM.  The men inside the 
factories also received all of their guidance from the Communist leadership, which allowed them 
to maintain peace and order inside those factories for the duration of the strike.
Without the presence of the left wing elements in Flint, the strike movement may not 
have even happened.  Without the leadership and organizational abilities of men like Mortimer 
and Travis, the autoworkers in Flint would not have been able to seize on such an opportunity.  
When Mortimer first came to Flint in the summer of 1936 he found a floundering union with few 
men on the rolls.  He also discovered that the men on the board of the union there were mostly 
GM spies and untrustworthy.  At first when he approached men about joining the union he found 
that no one trusted the union and he had to convince them that he was not part of the AFL and 
that the goals of the UAW were quite different.  His drive and leadership, along with the 
ideologies that he was sharing with the autoworkers, brought the men into the union that 
summer.  Without this unionization drive the Sit-Down strike would not have been possible.
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It is because of the importance of the relationship between the rank and file autoworkers 
in Flint and the Communist Party that this study is so important.  It was a vital part of the Sit-
Down strike and the autoworkers’ personal stories cannot be ignored.  It does not darken the 
strikers’ heroic image but illuminates it because it makes it possible to understand the world that 
they were living and fighting in when they sat down inside the factories.
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